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INTERNATIONAL DIRECTIVES RELATING TO
SENTENCING
Johan D. van der Vyver*
INTRODUCTION
Punishment in international law must fit the crime, the personal dispensation
of the criminal, and the interests of the international community. This basic norm
of criminal justice is reflected in Article 78(1) of the Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC Statute) which provides that “in determining the sentence,
the Court shall, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, take
into account such factors as the gravity of the crime and the personal
circumstances of the convicted person.”1 Leaving it up to drafters of the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence to afford substance to this basic principle became
necessary due to the time constraints under which the Conference of Diplomatic
Plenipotentiaries for an International Criminal Court, which was convened in
Rome on June 15 through July 17, 1998, had to complete its primary mission,
and the many controversies that prevailed among delegations that tended to
prefer their own legal traditions, including constitutional standards of their
respective countries.2
This Essay is focused on circumstances to be considered by a criminal court
for purposes of determining an appropriate sentence following the conviction of
an accused. It will appear that much confusion prevailed in this regard in the
jurisprudence of international tribunals such as the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). One analyst, writing at approximately the turn of
the century, observed that judgments of these ad hoc tribunals on penal policy
are “far from being comprehensive” and that “there is no emerging penal regime
discernible,”3 but concluded, somewhat inconsistently, that jurisprudence of the
*
I.T. Cohen Professor of International law and Human Rights, Emory University School of Law;
Extraordinary Professor in the Department of Private Law of the University of Pretoria.
1
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M.
1002 (1998), art. 78(1) [hereinafter ICC Statute]. See also Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No 11. IT-95-14-T,
Judgement, ¶ 771 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000).
2
Jens Peglau, Penalties and the Determination of the Sentence in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS 141 (Horst Fisher, Claus Krez & Sascha Rold Lüder eds., 2001).
3
Jan Christoph Nemitz, Sentencing in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 605, 624 (Horst Fisher, Claus Krez & Sascha Rold Lüder eds.,
2001).
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ad hoc tribunals “is gradually developing into an international law of
sentencing.”4
It is important to note that what has been held out by the ad hoc Tribunals as
objectives/ purposes/principles/functions/policies/goals of sentencing5 should,
in some instances, have no bearing on the kind or severity of punishments
imposed in any given case (e.g. retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation,
deterrence). It is wrong to say categorically that “[t]he objectives of punishment
provide . . . guidance in determining sentence.”6 Factors that ought to be
considered for sentencing purposes may in general be classified, for the sake of
systematic clarity, into two main categories: (1) those that constitute elements
of an offence, and (2) those that attend the commission of the offence but are not
part-and-parcel of the actus reus. One can, of course, classify all factors that
have a bearing on the severity of a sentence as either aggravating or extenuating
circumstances. However, the concept of “aggravating and extenuating
circumstances” will—for purposes of this survey—be confined to those
sentencing considerations that do not form part of the criminal act as such. Those
that do constitute elements of the offence are confined in this survey to
“sentencing factors of the offence.”
One should namely distinguish between (a) the essence of punishment
(retribution); (b) the functions of punishment (incapacitation, rehabilitation,
deterrence, and avoiding impunity); (c) factors inherent in or resulting from a
particular offence and which may be taken into account in determining an
appropriate sentence (sentencing factors of the offence); and (d) circumstances
attending the commission of an offence that have a bearing on an appropriate
sentence in any given case but are in themselves not constituent elements of the
criminal act as such (extenuating and aggravating circumstances).
I.

THE ESSENCE OF SENTENCING (RETRIBUTION)

A sentence imposed by a court of law is essentially a manifestation of
retribution. In the Čelebići case, the ICTY depicted the theory of retribution as
“an inheritance of the primitive theory of revenge, which urges the Trial

4

Id. at 625.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarać, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgement, ¶ 836, (Int’l Crim.
Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001) (referring interchangeably to sentencing “objectives,”
“purposes,” “principles,” “functions,” or “policy” that ought to guide judicial officers when deciding on an
appropriate sentence).
6
See Prosecutor v. Banović, Case No. IT-02-65/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 33, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 28, 2003).
5
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Chamber to retaliate to appease the victim.”7 The Tribunal added: “A
consideration of retribution as the only factor in sentencing is likely to be
counter-productive and disruptive of the entire purpose of the Security Council,
which is the restoration and maintenance of peace in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia. Retributive punishment by itself does not bring justice.”8
In Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, the ICTY came to the opposite
conclusion:
[Retribution] is not to be understood as fulfilling a desire for revenge
but as duly expressing the outrage of the international community at
these crimes . . . A sentence of the International Tribunal should make
plain the condemnation of the international community of the behavior
in question and show “that the international community was not ready
to tolerate serious violations of international humanitarian law and
human rights.”9

In Prosecutor v. Todorović, a Trial Chamber of the ICTY gave the following
assessment of retribution:
The principle of retribution, if it is to be applied at all in the context of
sentencing, must be understood as reflecting a fair and balanced
approach to the exaction of punishment for wrongdoing. This means
that the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the wrongdoing; in
other words that the punishment be made to fit the crime. The Chamber
is of the view that this principle is reflected in the account, which the

7
Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, ¶ 1231 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998).
8
Id. .See also Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-Tbis-R.117, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 7 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 11, 1999); Faiza P. King & Anne-Marie La Rosa, Penalties Under the
ICC Statute, in ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 311, 329-30 (Flavia
Lattanzi & William A. Schabas eds.,1999) (referring to exactly this type of occurrence in Rwanda).
9
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, ¶ 185 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Mar. 24, 2000) (citing Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 28 (Sept.
4, 1998)). See also Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, ¶ 848 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000); Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgement, ¶ 900 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003); Prosecutor v. Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 34; Prosecutor v.
Obrenović, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 50 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Dec. 10, 2003); Prosecutor v. Češić, Case No. IT-95-10/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 23 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 11, 2004); Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61-S, Sentencing Judgement,
¶¶ 143, 150 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 30, 2004); Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-9514/2-A, Appeal Judgement, ¶ 1075 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004); Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik, Case No. IT-09-39-A, Appeal Chamber Judgement, ¶ 775, 804 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Mar. 17, 2009); Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3484-tENG-Corr,
Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, ¶ 38 (May 23, 2014); Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 11 (Mar. 21,
2016).
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Chamber is obliged by the Statute and the Rules to take, of the gravity
of the crime.10

Earlier, a Trial Chamber of the same tribunal defined the proportionality
principle inherent in the concept of retribution more accurately by referring to
retribution as “‘just deserts’, . . . the punishment having to be proportional to the
gravity of the crime and the moral guilt of the convicted.”11
It is wrong, of course, to say that the purpose of punishment is retribution,12
because punishment for criminal conduct is (a form of) retribution. In one of its
more recent judgments, the ICTR stated: “Retribution is the expression of the
social disapproval attached to a criminal act and to its perpetrator and demands
punishment for the latter for what he has done.”13
The ICTY was perfectly correct when it, in the case of Kunarać, defined
retribution as merely “punishment of an offender for his specific criminal
conduct.”14 So too was a passage taken from a Canadian case that succinctly
proclaimed: “Retribution requires the imposition of a just and appropriate
punishment and nothing more.”15 In a similar vein, Faiza King and Anne-Marie
La Rosa identified retribution “in the sense of punishment rather than revenge”
as a goal of the ICC.16 Just to emphasize it once again, punishment is a particular
manifestation of retribution; it is therefore wrong to say that retribution is a
function or the purpose of punishment or worse still, is an element to be taken
into account for sentencing purposes. When it is said that “retribution may be
out of fashion with legal scholars,”17 this must be understood in the context only
10
Prosecutor v. Todorović, Case No. IT-95-9/1-T, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 29 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2001). See also Prosecutor v. Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 34; Prosecutor v. Češić,
supra note 9, ¶ 23.
11
Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-94-1-Tbis-R.117, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 65 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 1996) (emphasis added). See also Prosecutor v. Kambanda, supra note 9,
¶ 58; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgement ¶ 243 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia June 25, 1999) (noting that a sentence depends mainly on the “magnitude of the crime and the extent
of liability of the accused”); Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-Tbis-R.117, Judgment in Sentencing Appeal,
Separate Opinion of Judge Cassese, ¶ 8 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 26, 2000) (noting that,
in addition to extenuating and aggravating circumstances, sentences are determined by “the degree of iniquity
of the crime” and “the subjective state of mind of the convicted person”); Prosecutor v. Obrenović, supra note
9, ¶ 50; Prosecutor v. Kordić, supra note 9, ¶ 1075; Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, supra note 9, ¶ 804; Prosecutor v.
Bemba Gombo, supra note 9, ¶ 11.
12
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 24.
13
Prossecutor v. Rutaganira, Case No. ICTR-95-1C-T, Judgement & Sentence, ¶ 108 (Mar. 14, 2005).
14
Prosecutor v. Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 841. See also Prosecutor v. Krnojelać, Case No. IT-97-25-T,
Judgement ¶ 508 (Mar. 15, 2002).
15
Prosecutor v. Kordić, supra note 9, ¶ 1075 (referring to R v. M, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, ¶ 80 (Canada)).
16
King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 330.
17
Id.
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of the fallacious assumption that retribution is a function or purpose of
punishment, or a circumstance to be considered for sentencing purposes.
II. THE FUNCTIONS OF PUNISHMENT
Justifications for punishment include incapacitation of the convicted
criminal, his or her rehabilitation, and deterrence.18 The European Court of
Human Rights has identified as “penological grounds” for detention,
objectives—such as punishment, deterrence, public protection, and
rehabilitation.19 To this list should be added the objective of obviating impunity.
The functions of punishment will for purposes of the present survey be classified
under the headings of (a) incapacitation, (b) rehabilitation, (c) deterrence, and
(d) obviating impunity.
A. Incapacitation
The protection of society is relevant and important when persons guilty of
serious crimes are regarded as dangerous to the community.20 This would
particularly be the case where a person who instigated the commission of a crime
might re-offend.21 Such protection is normally achieved by incarceration of a
convicted criminal.
Taking this function of punishment into account when deciding on the length
of imprisonment requires special circumspection, because “our ability to predict
which offenders are likely to re-offend is so poor.”22 The crimes within the
jurisdiction of international tribunals are in many cases ones that would normally
be committed in very special circumstances, such as an armed conflict or largescale political unrest, and when those circumstances no longer prevail‒‒and that
is mostly the case at the time perpetrators of the concerned offences are brought
to trial‒‒the need for the community to be protected becomes negligible.23

18
Mirko Bagaric & Kumar Amarasekara, The Error of Retributivism, 24 MELBOURNE L. REV. 124, at
134 (2000). See also King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 329 (mentioning retribution [sic], deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation as “objectives of punishment”).
19
Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H. R. 317, ¶ 40 (July 9, 2013). See also the British case
of R. v. Bieber, [2009] 1 WLR 233 (CA), ¶ 40 (listing as “legitimate objects” of imprisonment, “punishment,
deterrence, rehabilitation and protection of the public”).
20
Prosecutor v. Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1232.
21
King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 332.
22
Bagaric & Amarasekara, supra note 18, at 135.
23
King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 331.
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In Kunarać, the Trial Chamber practically ruled out protection of society as
a legitimate sentencing incentive:
Unless it can be shown that a particular convicted person has the
propensity to commit violations of international humanitarian law, or,
possibly, crimes relevant to such violations, such as “hate” crimes or
discriminatory crimes, it may not be fair and reasonable to use
protection of society, or preventive detention, as a general sentencing
factor.24

B. Rehabilitation
It has been said that rehabilitation “should be one of the goals of
sentencing,”25 and “that punishment must strive to attain . . . rehabilitation.”26 In
Prosecutor v. Češić, the Sentencing Tribunal took into account for purposes of
punishment “the rehabilitative potential” of the convicted person, noting that
such potential goes hand in hand with reintegration of the convicted person into
society.27
It is one thing to say that the Accused has shown remorse and has undergone
a change of heart, which may be a legitimate mitigating factor for purposes of
sentencing;28 it is quite another to proclaim rehabilitation and reconciliation to
be determinants of an appropriate punishment. Faiza King and Anne-Marie La
Rosa have argued that rehabilitation could be a relevant consideration for
sentencing purposes in cases of “low-ranking soldiers or civilians who simply
followed orders,” and in the case of young offenders.29 They also slightly missed

24
Prosecutor v. Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 843. See also Prosecutor v. Krnojelać, supra note 14, ¶ 508
(noting that incapacitation of the dangerous is of little significance for sentencing purposes); Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik, supra note 9, ¶ 776; Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, supra note 9, ¶ 11; Krajis Stuart Beresford,
Unshackling the Paper Tiger—The Sentencing Practices of the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 1 INT’L CR. L. REV. 33, at 45–46 (2001).
25
William A. Schabas, Penalties, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 1497, 1519 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002); and see Prosecutor
v. Tadić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 8, ¶ 61; Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Second
Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 16(i) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia March 5, 1998) (appearing under the
heading “Age”); Prosecutor v. Furundžiya, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, ¶ 291 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 12, 26 (May 21, 1999);
Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, supra note 9, ¶ 849.
26
Prosecutor v. Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 53. See also id., at 146 (the Sentencing Tribunal accepting
“steps taken toward rehabilitation” as a mitigating factor).
27
Prosecutor v. Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 27.
28
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 68 (June 1, 2000)
(noting that “there is cause to believe that the accused has undergone a profound change and there are good
reasons to expect his re-integration into society”).
29
King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 332.
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the point. The fact that a particular perpetrator was a low-ranking member of the
armed forces following orders or was relatively young at the time the crime was
committed, is indeed a mitigating circumstance and would be deserving of
special rehabilitation efforts, but his or her possible rehabilitation as such is not
a factor to be considered for sentencing purposes. To argue otherwise might even
be taken to justify longer prison sentences in such cases so as to increase the
time available for a rehabilitation program to have a better chance of success.
There are judgments proclaiming rehabilitation to be one of the “principal
aims” of sentencing,30 or in the case of “younger, or less-educated, members of
society,” laying stress on “reintegrating the guilty accused into society.”31 In
Prosecutor v. Furundžiya, the Trial Chamber expressed its support for
“rehabilitative programmes in which the accused may participate while serving
his sentence.”32 In the Sentencing Judgment in the case of Prosecutor v.
Serushago, the ICTR noted, under the heading of mitigating circumstances, that
the family obligations of the Accused, his relatively young age, and the fact that
he cooperated with the Prosecutor and publicly showed remorse, “would suggest
possible rehabilitation.”33
In the Čelebići Case, on the other hand, the Appeals Chamber decided that
rehabilitation “cannot play a prominent role in the decision-making process of
the Trial Chamber of the Tribunal.”34 One analyst noted that in sentencing
policies of the ad hoc Tribunals rehabilitation is regarded as subordinate to

30

Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶ 33.
Prosecutor v. Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1233 (where, for sentencing purposes, the Tribunal considered
“the age of the accused, his circumstances, his ability to be rehabilitated and availability of facilities in the
confinement facility”); see also Prosecutor v. Kordić, supra note 9, ¶ 1079; see generally, Beresford, supra note
24, at 44.
32
Prosecutor v. Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 291 (laying special stress on the relatively young age of the
Accused, who was 23 when the crime was committed). See also Prosecutor v. Kupreṧkić, supra note 9, ¶ 849
(expressing its support for the sentencing purpose of rehabilitation “in the hope that in future, if faced with
similar circumstances, they [the persons convicted] will uphold the rule of law”); Prosecutor v. Erdemović,
Second Sentencing Judgment, supra note 25, ¶ 16(i) under the heading: “Age”.
33
Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S-T, ¶ 39 (Feb. 5, 1999).
34
Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-A, ¶ 806 (Feb. 20, 2001). See also Prosecutor v. Blaṧkić,
supra note 1, ¶ 781–82; Prosecutor v. Kronjelać, supra note 14, ¶ 508; Prosecutor v. Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 35;
Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 133 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Dec. 18, 2003); Prosecutor v. Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 143; Prosecutor v. Kordić, supra note 9,
¶1079; Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgement, ¶ 402 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006); Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Case No. IT-01-47-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 325, 328 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 22, 2008); Prosecutor v. Krajiṧnik, supra note 9, ¶ 806; Prosecutor
v. Kabashi, Case No. IT-04-84-R77-1, ¶ 11 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 16, 2011);
Prosecutor v. Katanga, supra note 9, ¶ 38; Prosecutor v. Popović , Case No. IT-05-88-A, ¶ 1966 (Jan. 30, 2015);
Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, supra note 9, at ¶ 11.
31
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deterrence.35 In its first sentencing judgment in the Case of Erdemović, the ICTY
altogether ruled out rehabilitation as a sentencing objective.36
It has been said that rehabilitation and punishment may be inconsistent.37 A
penitentiary is evidently not an ideal setting for rehabilitation.38 Prison
conditions, on the contrary, have the propensity to promote recidivism. It is
furthermore questionable whether rehabilitation efforts are at all called for in
cases of “Makrokriminalität”; that is “criminality in which the State or some
similar entity is directly involved.”39
However, rehabilitation has come to be accepted as an important objective
of imprisonment. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
indeed provides: “The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners
the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation.”40
Rehabilitation also features prominently in the United Nations’ Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.41
At the regional level, the European Prison Rules of the Council of Europe
similarly provide: “All detentions shall be managed so as to facilitate the
reintegration into a free society of persons who have been deprived of their
liberty.”42 The Rules further provide that “the [prison] regime for sentenced
35

Nemitz, supra note 3, at 614.
Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 11, ¶ 66. See also King & La Rosa, supra
note 8, at 332.
37
Bagaric & Amarasekara, supra note 18, at 136.
38
See Prosecutor v. Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 844 (noting that to assume that “imprisonment alone . . .
can have a rehabilitative effect on a convicted person” is “a controversial proposition”).
39
Claus Kreß & Guran Sluiter, Preliminary Remarks, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1751, 1755 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds.,
2002).
40
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 10(3), Dec. 16,1966
(Annex), U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6314/49, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
See also American Convention on Human Rights, 1114 U.N.T.S. 123, art. 5(6), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
41
See United Nation’s Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, ¶ 56–64, ECOSOC Res.
663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957, as amended by ECOSOC Res. 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977 (emphasizing (a)
that the ultimate purpose of imprisonment is “to protect society against crime”, ¶ 58; (b) that steps should be
taken to ensure the prisoner’s “gradual return to life in society”, ¶ 60(2); (c) that community agencies should be
enlisted, wherever possible, “to assist the staff of the institution in the task of rehabilitation of the prisoners”,
¶ 61; that medical services should be provided “to detect and . . . treat any physical or mental illness or defect
which may hamper a prisoner’s rehabilitation”, ¶ 62; (d) that treatment of each prisoner is to be individualized,
¶ 59, 63(1); (e) that individualization of treatment should not be hampered by a too large prison population in
closed institutions, ¶ 63(3); and that rehabilitation efforts do not end upon a prisoner’s release, and that aftercare should be provided by government or private agencies, ¶ 64).
42
European Prison Rules, Rule 6, Recommendation REC (2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to
Member States, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on Jan. 11, 2006 at the 952d Meeting of the Ministers’
Deputies.
36
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persons shall be designed to enable them to lead a responsible and crime-free
life,”43 and that a sentence plan for each prisoner, and “a strategy for their
release” be devised,44 which may, as far as practicable, include work, education,
other activities and preparation for release.45 The European Court of Human
Rights has noted that “the emphasis in European penal policy is now on the
rehabilitative aim of imprisonment, particularly toward the end of a long prison
sentence.”46 For this reason, life sentences without the option of parole have
come to be unacceptable, “since all prisoners, including those serving life
sentences, be offered the possibility of rehabilitation and the prospect of release
if that rehabilitation is achieved.47 The Court noted that “if a prisoner is
incarcerated without any prospect of release and without the possibility of
having his life sentence reviewed, there is the risk that he can never atone for his
offence: whatever the prisoner does in prison, however exceptional his progress
towards rehabilitation, his punishment remains fixed and unreviewable.”48
Provision must therefore be made for the reducibility of a life sentence “which
allows the domestic authorities to consider whether any changes in the life
prisoner are so significant, and such progress towards rehabilitation has been
made in the course of the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no
longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds.”49
The Court cited Article 110(3) of the ICC Statute and the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence pertinent to that Article that make provision for the periodic
review of a life sentence after the convicted person has served twenty-five years
of the sentence, which in the opinion of the Court serve as a commendable
directive of contemporary international criminal law.50
The above goes to show that once a person has been sentenced to
imprisonment, provision should be made for, and he or she should be given the
benefit of, rehabilitation programs. It does not imply that rehabilitation should

43

Id., Rule 102.1.
See id., Rule 103.2.
45
Id., Rule 103.4.
46
Vinter v. United Kingdom, supra note 19, ¶ 115. See also Dickson v. The United Kingdom (GC) Appl.
No. 44362/04, 2007-V ECHR, ¶ 75 (Dec. 4, 1997); Boulois v. Luxemburg (GC), Appl. No. 37575/04, Eur. Ct.
H. R., ¶ 83 (Apr. 3, 2012). Special emphasis was placed on re-integration into society of a prisoner as an objective
of incarceration in Mastromatteo v. Italy (GC) Appl. No. 37703/97, 2002-VIII ECHR, ¶ 72 (Oct. 24, 2002);
Schemkamper v. France, Appl. No. 75833/01, ¶ 31 (Oct. 18, 2005); Majorano v. Italy, Appl. No 28634/06, ¶ 108
(Dec. 15, 2009).
47
Vinter v. United Kingdom, supra note 19, ¶ 114. See also id., ¶ 116.
48
Id., ¶ 112.
49
Id., ¶ 119.
50
Id., ¶ 65 and 114.
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serve as a factor to be taken into account when deciding on an appropriate
sentence.
This means that once a person has been sentenced to imprisonment,
provision should be made for, and he or she should be given the benefits of,
rehabilitation programs. It does not imply that rehabilitation should serve as a
factor to be considered when deciding on an appropriate sentence.
C. Deterrence and General Rehabilitation
According to Faiza King and Anne-Marie La Rosa, deterrence of future
crimes “is obviously a primary goal of the ICC.”51 It has been decided that
deterrence “is a consideration that may legitimately be considered in
sentencing.”52 Deterrence has also been singled out in some judgments of the ad
hoc tribunals as “probably the most important [sentencing] factor.”53 In
Prosecutor v. Tadić, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY did observe that
deterrence “must not be accorded undue prominence in the overall assessment
of the sentences to be imposed on persons convicted by the International
Tribunal.”54 In Prosecutor v. Todorović, a Trial Chamber of the ICTY
recognized “the importance of deterrence as a general consideration in
sentencing,” but then somewhat obscurely promised that it “will not treat
deterrence as a distinct factor in determining sentence in this case.”55 As noted
in Prosecutor v. Furundžiya, punishment as such, rather than the severity of a
sentence, is in reality “the tool of retribution, stigmatization and deterrence.”56
In Prosecutor v. Delalić, the Tribunal included in the concept of deterrence,
(a) deterring the accused, and (b) deterring other persons finding themselves in
similar situations in the future,57 referred to in Prosecutor v. Kunarać as,

51

King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 330.
Tadić, supra note 11, ¶ 48; Delalić, supra note 34, ¶ 803; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 24.
53
Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1234; Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶ 64-66; Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 28;
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-S, Sentence, ¶ 19 (Oct. 2, 1998); Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 288;
Serushago, supra note 25, ¶ 20; Kayishema, supra note 25, Sentence ¶ 2; Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 761; Ruggiu,
supra note 28, ¶ 33; Stakić, supra note 9, ¶ 900; Dragan Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 134; Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda,
Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 754, 760, 765 (Jan. 24, 2004); Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 144;
Beresford, supra note 24, at 42.
54
Tadić , supra note 11, ¶ 48; Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 185; Delalić, supra note 34, ¶ 801; Prosecutor
v. Dario Kordić & Mario Čerlkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, ¶ 847 (Feb. 26, 2001); Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 34;
Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 26; Krajišnik, supra note 9, ¶ 805.
55
Todorović, supra note 10, ¶ 30.
56
Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 290.
57
Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1234; Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 288.
52
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respectively, “specific deterrence” and “general deterrence”,58 and in later
judgments as “personal”, “individual” or “special” deterrence, and “general”
deterrence, respectfully.59 This vital distinction is not always evident in
judgments of the ad hoc Tribunals.60 Emphasis is almost exclusively on general
deterrence.61 It has thus been said in a judgment of the ICTR: “This Chamber
seeks to dissuade for good those who will attempt in future to perpetuate such
atrocities by showing them that the international community was not ready to
tolerate the serious violations on international humanitarian law and human
rights.”62
The ICTY on several occasions expressed the opinion, in the spirit of general
deterrence, that “[o]ne of the main purposes of a sentence imposed by an
international tribunal is to influence the legal awareness of the accused, the
surviving victims, their relatives, the witnesses and the general public in order
to reassure them that the legal system is implemented and enforced,” and
additionally, “to convey the message that globally accepted laws and rules have
to be obeyed by everyone.”63 In Prosecutor v. Češić, the Sentencing Tribunal
observed that general deterrence “serves to strengthen the legal order . . . and to
reassure society of the effectiveness of its general provisions.”64 In Prosecutor
v. Kabashi, the Sentencing Tribunal warned that “persons who believe
themselves to be beyond the reach of the International Tribunal must be warned
that they have to abide by its orders or face prosecution and, if convicted,
sanctions.”65 Affirmative prevention through legal sanctions in times of war

58
Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 839; Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1203; Bagaric, supra note 18, at 137; Češić,
supra note 9, ¶ 25 (referring to “special deterrence” and “general deterrence”); Katanga, supra note 9, at para
38; Bemba Gombo, supra note 9, ¶ 11.
59
Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 134-35; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 145-46; Kordić, supra note 9, ¶ 1076-78;
Krajišnik, supra note 9, ¶ 805; Kabashi, supra note 34, ¶11.
60
Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 839.
61
See Prosecutor v. Nderubumwe Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 456
(Dec. 6, 1999) (noting that punishment is directed at retribution “and over and above that” at deterrence);
Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 28; Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 20 (Feb. 5, 1999); Todorović , supra note 10, ¶ 30;
Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 28 (Feb. 27, 2003); Stakić, supra
note 9, ¶ 899; Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 34; Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 124; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 25; Kordić,
supra note 9, ¶ 1080–82; Kabashi, supra note 34, ¶11. See also Daniel B. Richard, Proposed Sentencing
Guidelines for the International Criminal Court, LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 123, at 125 (1997); Beresford,
supra note 24, at 42.
62
Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 28; Kayishema, supra note 25, ¶ 2; Todorović, Sentencing Judgment, supra
note 10, ¶ 30.
63
Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 139; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 149.
64
Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 26.
65
Kabashi, supra note 34, ¶ 11; Kupreškić, supra note 9, ¶ 848; Kordić, supra note 9, ¶ 1078, 1080-82;
Krajišnik, supra note 9, ¶ 807.
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“have to demonstrate the fallacy of the old Roman principle of inter arma silent
leges (amid the arms of war the laws are silent.66
In Prosecutor v. Stakić, the Trial Chamber stated, quite confusingly, that
“general deterrence is more accurately described as deterrence aiming at
reintegrating potential perpetrators into the global society.”67 Re-integration of
a convicted felon into society has to do with rehabilitation and not with
deterrence; and furthermore, to maintain that persons other than the criminal are
in need of being reintegrated into society is a rather stupid thing to say.
In Kunarać, the Trial Chamber, quite realistically, concluded that “special
deterrence, as a sentencing factor, is generally of little significance before this
jurisdiction,” simply because “the likelihood of persons convicted here ever
again being faced with an opportunity to commit war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide or grave breaches is so remote as to render its consideration
in this way unreasonable and unfair.”68
General deterrence ought not to be considered as a sentencing factor for
reasons of principle rather than practicality, since punishment should address the
culpable conduct of the accused only, and it would be unfair to impose a harsh
sentence on the convicted person in the expectation that it might deter others.69
D. Obviating Impunity
Thwarting impunity,70 and reprobation by the community or stigmatization
of the convicted criminal,71 were mentioned in a sentencing context in judgments
of the ICTY and the ICTR. In Prosecutor v. Furundžiya, the Trial Chamber said:
“It is the mandate and the duty of the International Tribunal, in contributing to
reconciliation, to deter such crimes and to combat impunity.”72 One analyst
66

Kordić, supra note 9, ¶ 1078.
Stakić, supra note 9, ¶ 902; Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 137; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 147 (referring also
to Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 185); Delalić, supra note 34, ¶ 806.
68
Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 840; see also Krnojelać, supra note 14, ¶ 508; Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 52
(noting that deterrence should not be afforded “undue prominence”); Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 145; Beresford,
supra note 24, at 45; Bagaric & Amarasekara, supra note 18, at 137 (noting that specific deterrence does not
work in cases of severe punishments such as imprisonment).
69
Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 840; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 26.
70
Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶ 65; Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 26; Akayesusupra note 53; Furundžiya,
supra note 25, ¶ 288; Rutaganda, supra note 61, ¶ 455.
71
Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶¶ 64, 65, 66; see also Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 289; Blaškić, supra
note 1, ¶ 763.
72
Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 288; see also Kamuhanda, supra note 53, ¶ 754; Mark A. Drumbl,
Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to ‘Civis’ in Rwanda, 75 N.Y. UNIV. L. REV. 1221, at 1277
(2000).
67
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expressed the view that stigmatization of the perpetrator in itself “is often
sufficient redress.73 Although these appendices of punishment are important
considerations for criminalizing certain atrocious acts and creating tribunals for
their prosecution, they have no place, really, in sentencing guidelines.
Putting institutions and procedures in place to bring perpetrators of such
atrocities to answer for their conduct will inevitably result in absence of
impunity, condemnation of the act and the actor by right-thinking members of
the world community and disgracing the convicted perpetrators for what they
have done. Those consequences also serve as justification for having an
international criminal justice system in place, but should not, perhaps even could
not, have a bearing on an appropriate sentence in any given case. Because of
these considerations, the criminal act must be punished, but the kind and gravity
of the punishment to be imposed are conditioned by considerations other than
the inevitable function and effects of punishment per se.
Blameworthiness of perpetrators of criminal conduct, in a word, legitimizes
obviating impunity, reprobation, and stigmatization; but preventing impunity,
reprobation, and stigmatization does not determine the subjective
blameworthiness of the perpetrator.
III. SENTENCING FACTORS
A retributive response to crime must, for purposes of punishment, account
for several factors inherent in, or attending, the criminal conduct. At the Rome
Conference, the Working Group on Penalties listed those factors, somewhat
unsystematically and as a guide for Drafters of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, as including:
[T]he impact of the crime on the victims and their families; the extent
of damage caused or the danger posed by the convicted person’s
conduct; the degree of participation of the convicted person in the
commission of the crime; the circumstances falling short of exclusion
of criminal responsibility such as substantially diminished mental
capacity or, as appropriate, duress; the age of the convicted person; the
social and economic condition of the convicted person; the motive for
the commission of the crime; the subsequent conduct of the person
who committed the crime; superior orders; the use of minors in the
commission of the crime.74

73
William A. Schabas, Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach, 7 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L.J. 461, 502 (1997).
74
Rep. of the Working Group on Penalties, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGP/L.14/Corr.2 (1998).
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These guidelines were intended to fit the general directive enunciated in the
Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals75 and which did go into the Statute of the ICC,
reducing the sentencing factors to ones “such . . . as the gravity of the crime and
the individual circumstances of the convicted person,”76 thereby upholding the
principle of proportionality (punishment must be proportional to the gravity of
the crime) and the principle of individualization (punishment must be based on
personal circumstances of the convicted person).77 It has accordingly been
decided that a trial tribunal must observe “the over-riding obligation to
individualize a penalty to fit the individual circumstances of the accused and the
gravity of the crime.”78 As succinctly stated in Prosecutor v. Obrenović: “An
accused shall be held liable for his actions and omissions—no more and no
less.”79
A. Gravity of the Offence
In the Čelebići Case, the Trial Chamber said: “By far the most important
consideration, which may be regarded as the litmus test for the appropriate
sentence, is the gravity of the offence.”80
75
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 24(2), contained in the
annex of the Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808
(1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1192 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International Tribunal for
Rwanda, art. 23(2), contained in the annex of S.C. Res. 955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1602 (1994)
[hereinafter ICTR Statute]; see Akayesu, Sentence, supra note 53; Schabas, supra note 25, 1523–24.
76
Rep. of the Working Group on Penalties, art. 77(1), supra note 74; see ICC Statute, supra note 1, art.
78(1).
77
See King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 332–37; Peglau, supra note 2, at 147; see also Erdemović, supra
note 11, ¶ 41 (speaking of “[t]he principle of proportionality and of appropriateness of sentence to the
individual”); Tadić, supra note 8, ¶ 61; Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 771; Rutaganira, supra note 13, ¶ 115; Bemba
Gombo, supra note 9, ¶ 11;
78
Delalić, supra note 34, ¶ 717; see also Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 58; Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 22;
Aleksovski, supra note 11, ¶ 242; Kupreškić, supra note 9, ¶ 852; Čerkez, supra note 54, ¶ 847; Todorović,
supra note 10, ¶ 110; Krnojelać, supra note 14, ¶ 507; Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-55-T,
Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 1097 (Dec. 3, 2003); Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 54, 62; Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case
No. IT-94-2-A, ¶ 9 (Feb. 4, 2005); Kajelijeli v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgement, ¶ 291 (May
23, 2005); Stakić, supra note 34, ¶ 375; Prosecutor v. Naletilić, Case No. IT-98-34-A, ¶ 593 (May 3, 2006);
Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, ¶ 2263 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 18,
2008); Prosecutor v. Renzaho, Case No. ICTR-97-31-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 817 (July 14, 2009);
Prosecutor v. Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 673 (Mar. 31, 2011).
79
Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 78.
80
Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1225; see also id., ¶ 1260 (calling gravity of an offence the “touchstone of
sentencing”); Erdemović, supra note 25, ¶ 15; Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 27; Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No.
IT-95-10-T, Judgement, ¶ 121 (Dec. 14, 1999); Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 182; Kupreškić, supra note 9, ¶ 852;
Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶ 47–49; Prosecutor v. Furundžiya, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgement, ¶ 249 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000); Delalić, supra note 34, ¶ 847, 731; Kunarać, supra note
5, ¶ 841; Kordić, supra note 54, ¶ 847; Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgement, ¶ 101 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 5, 2001); Todorović , supra note 10, ¶ 29, 31; Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić,
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The gravity of the crime “is normally the starting point for consideration of
an appropriate sentence,”81 and has been singled out as “[t]he cardinal feature in
sentencing.”82
Retribution requires a certain proportionality between the gravity of a crime
and the punishment imposed for that crime.83 Gravity of the crime was said to
depend on the circumstances of the case as well as the form and degree of
participation in the crime by the Accused.84 The element of gravity is more
broadly determined by (i) the nature of the crime, (ii) the manner in which it was
executed, (iii) the motive of the perpetrator, and (iv) the consequences of the
criminal act.85 It should be noted that the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence
pertaining to the determination of sentence make no mention of the nature of the
crime as such. This does not mean that the ICC will not for sentencing purposes
consider the inherent gravity of a particular crime. The Rules do refer to “the
extent of damage caused” and “the nature of the unlawful behavior and the
means employed to execute the crime” as factors to be considered by the Court
in its determination of sentence,86 and those factors, among others, do have an
impact on the nature and gravity of an offence. The sentencing factors listed in
the Rules are furthermore expressly stated as applying only inter alia, and
aggravating circumstances may include others not listed in the Rules “which,
although not enumerated . . . , by virtue of their nature are similar to those
mentioned.”87

Case No. IT-98-33-T, ¶ 698 (Aug. 2, 2001); Prosecutor v. Duško Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-S, ¶ 106 (Nov. 13,
2001); Prosecutor v. Plavšić (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 61, ¶ 23; 25, 52; Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić,
Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, ¶ 101-02 (Dec. 2, 2003); Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 144; Prosecutor
v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, ¶ 156 (Feb. 25, 2004); Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 31; Deronjić, supra note 9F,
¶ 154; Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, ¶ 267 (Apr. 19, 2004); Stakić, supra note 34, ¶ 375; Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, ¶ 36 (July 10, 2012); Bemba Gombo, supra note 9, ¶ 15.
81
Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 182; Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 36.
82
Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶ 25; Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 36.
83
Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 126 (referring to “the fundamental principle of proportionality”); King & La
Rosa, supra note 8, at 333; Beresford, supra note 24, at 41, 46; see also Richard, supra note 61, at 125 (insofar
as he identifies the proportionality requirement with the lex talionis, Richard has it slightly wrong).
84
Kupreškić, supra note 9, ¶ 852; Delalić, supra note 34, ¶ 731; Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶ 26; Češić, supra
note 9, ¶ 32.
85
See King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 334 (mentioning, with reference to jurisprudence of the ad hoc
Tribunals, the hierarchy of crimes, the number of victims killed, the relative scale and magnitude of the crime,
and other factors, such as the existence of an armed conflict); Nemitz, supra note 3, at 614 (noting, with a
different emphasis, that the ranking of crimes is determined by the nature of the crime and the consequences of
the act).
86
Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Finalized Draft Text of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 145(1)(c), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/Inf/3/Add.1 (July 12, 2000)
[hereinafter “RPE”].
87
Id.; Rule 145(2)(b)(vi).
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1. The Nature of the Crime
The nature of the crime has a particular bearing on its relative gravity for
sentencing purposes. The special gravity of the offences within the jurisdiction
of the ad hoc Tribunals has been emphasized in many of the Tribunals’
judgments.88 The ICTR has thus proclaimed that all crimes within its jurisdiction
are serious violations of international humanitarian law.89
In Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, a Trial Chamber of the ICTR referred to
“the principle of gradation in sentencing, which enables the Tribunal to
distinguish between crimes which are of the most heinous nature, and those
which, although reprehensible and deserving severe penalty, should not receive
the highest penalties.”90 Earlier, in Prosecutor v. Kambanda, the ICTR held that
“[t]he degree and magnitude of the crime is still an essential criterion for
evaluation of sentence.”91 The Tribunal laid special stress on the gravity of
crimes against humanity, noting that those crimes “are . . . conceived as offences
of the gravest kind against the life and liberty of the human being.”92 In
Prosecutor v. Serushago, the ICTR emphasized the “extreme gravity” of
genocide as “the crime of crimes.”93 Genocide and crimes against humanity have
been held to be inherently aggravating crimes.94 In Prosecutor v. Furundžiya,
the Trial Chamber stated that “[t]orture is one of the most serious offences
known to international criminal law and any sentence imposed must take this
into account.”95 In the same case, the Appeals Chamber decided that “crimes
which result in the loss of human life should be punished more severely.”96 In
Prosecutor v. Todorović, the Tribunal observed in the same context that

88
See Erdemović, supra note 25, ¶ 15; Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1225; Rutaganda, supra note 61, ¶ 468;
Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 782-86; Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 182; Furundžiya, supra note 80, ¶ 249; Delalić,
supra note 34, ¶ 731; Jelisić, supra note 80, ¶ 101; Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 144.
89
Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgement, ¶ 367 (June 1, 2001);
Bagosora, supra note 78, ¶ 2263; Renzaho, supra note 78, ¶ 817; Gatete, supra note 78, ¶ 673.
90
Prosecutor v. Elizaphan & Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-10-T & ICTR-96-17-T, ¶ 884 (Feb. 21,
2003).
91
Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 57.
92
Id., ¶ 43.
93
Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 15, 27; Niyitegeka v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-14-A, Appeal
Chamber Judgement, ¶ 53 (July 9, 2004). See infra, the text accompanying foonotes 95–98. See also Prosecutor
v. Omar Al Bashir (Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan
Ahmed Al Bashir), Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶ 133 (Mar. 4, 2009).
94
Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 33; Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶ 48.
95
Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 281.
96
Furundžiya, supra note 80, ¶ 244; see also Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-Tbis-R.117,
¶ 29 (July 14, 1997); Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 787; Nemitz, supra note 3, at 622-23.
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persecution “is a particularly serious crime,”97 and that this also applies to “the
murder and the sexual assaults perpetrated by the accused.”98
The question as to the existence of a hierarchy of crimes based on their
inherent gravity has provoked profound disagreement in the jurisprudence of the
ad hoc Tribunals and in scholarly comments on that jurisprudence. There are, to
be sure, those who maintain that the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ad hoc
Tribunals “are presented on an equal footing,” and that “it does not seem
possible to classify these international crimes in a hierarchical way.“99
The inherent gravity of some crimes over others cannot be denied.100 The
ICC Statute in fact contains several indications of a hierarchy of certain
crimes.101 It thus affords to States Parties the right to temporarily exclude the
exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC for war crimes committed in their territory or
by their nationals, but not others;102 the crime of genocide and crimes against
humanity are without exception to be regarded as “manifestly unlawful” and
liability for those crimes can therefore never be excused on the basis of superior
orders;103 defense of property can only exclude criminal responsibility for a war
crime and can therefore not be raised as a defense against charges of genocide
and crimes against humanity.104
The ongoing debate in this regard is mainly focused on the relative gravity
of crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Trial Chamber, in its sentencing
judgment in Prosecutor v. Tadić, based the extreme gravity of crimes against

97

Todorović, supra note 10, ¶ 57.
Id. ¶ 66.
99
Emanuela Fronza, Genocide in the Rome Statute, in 1 ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 105, 117–18 (Flavia Lattanzi & William A. Schabas eds., 1999). Fronza
refers to a passage in Prosecutor v. Akayesu where it was held that “there is no justification in the [ICTR] Statute
for finding that crimes against humanity or violations of common article 3 and additional protocol II are in all
circumstances alternative charges to genocide and thus lesser included offences.” Id. at 118 n.43; Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 470 (Sept. 2, 1998). Note, however, that Akayesu was not
concerned with the inherent gravity of crimes for sentencing purposes here but with the problem of bringing
cumulative charges. Id. See also Kayishema, supra note 89, ¶ 367; Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 13; Stakić, supra
note 34, ¶ 375.
100
King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 322–23; see, e.g. Kai Ambos, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in International
Criminal Law, in 4 SENTENCING AND SANCTIONING IN SUPRANATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 17, 33–34 (Roelof
Haveman & Olaoluwa Olusanya eds., 2006).
101
Schabas, supra note 25, at 1506.
102
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 124.
103
Id. art. 33(2); see Andreas Zimmermann, Superior Orders, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 957, 972 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D.
Jones eds., 2002).
104
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 31(1)(c).
98
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humanity on the fact that they, per definition, are committed on a widespread
scale or systematically:
A prohibited act committed as part of a crime against humanity, that is
with an awareness that the act formed part of a widespread or
systematic attack on a civilian population, is, all else being equal, a
more serious offence than an ordinary war crime. This follows from
the requirement that crimes against humanity be committed on a
widespread or systematic scale, the quantity of the crime having a
qualitative impact on the nature of the offence which is seen as a crime
against more than just the victims themselves but against humanity as
a whole.105

This approach finds support in the reasoning of the International Law
Commission (ILC). In a comment on the war crimes provisions in its 1996 Draft
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the ILC proclaimed
that crimes against the peace and security of mankind “are the most serious on
the scale of international offences” exactly because “the crimes in question must
have been committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale.”106
There seems to be general agreement that genocide constitutes “the crime of
crimes” and is therefore the most serious of offences within the subject-matter
jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals.107 In Prosecutor v. Kambanda,
the ICTR thus noted that genocide is “inherently aggravating,”108 and this fact is

105
Tadić, supra note 96, ¶ 73; see also Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Joint Separate
Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, ¶¶ 21, 25 (Oct. 7, 1997).
106
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, at 54 (1996)
(emphasis added); see also Micaela Frulli, Are Crimes Against Humanity More Serious than War Crimes?, 12
EUR. J. INT’L L. 329, 335 (2001).
107
Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 16; see also id. ¶ 42; Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 27; Rutaganda, supra note
61, ¶ 451; Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 986 (Jan. 27, 2000);
Jelisić (A), supra note 80, ¶ 13(Wald, J., partially dissenting); Krstić (T), supra note 80, ¶ 699; WILLIAM A.
SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10–11 (2000) (proclaiming that in a hierarchy founded on the
seriousness of crimes, “genocide belongs at the apex of the pyramid”); King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 322;
Schabas, Genocide, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 107, 109 (Otto Triffterer
ed., 1999); William A. Schabas, The Crime of Genocide in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 447, 463 (Horst Fischer, Claus Kress & Sascha Rolf
Lüder eds., 2001); Nemitz, supra note 3, at 620; LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 141 (2002); Antonio
Cassese, Genocide, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 335,
344–45 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002); Christine Byron, The Crime of
Genocide, in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 143, 144
(Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe & Eric Donnelly eds., 2004).
108
Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 42; see also Akayesu, supra note 99, ¶ 469; Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 15.
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germane to sentencing.109 However, it has also been said that it is “more
difficult” to rank the inherent gravity of genocide against that of crimes against
humanity.110
There is an influential body of opinion holding that the gravity of crimes
against humanity exceeds that of war crimes.111 It has been noted that crimes
against humanity and war crimes based on the same conduct protect different
interests.112 In Prosecutor v. Tadić, Judge Cassese in a separate opinion
maintained that although there is in abstracto no hierarchy of gravity applying
a priori to different crimes,113 such a hierarchy does emerge when the very same
act is classified as a war crime and a crime against humanity.114 Murder as a
crime against humanity would, for example, warrant a higher sentence than
murder as a war crime, because as a crime against humanity, willful killing
“possesses an objectively greater magnitude and reveals in the perpetrator a
subjective frame of mind which may imperil fundamental values of the
international community to a greater extent” than would be the case if the
offense was prosecuted as a war crime.115
The assumption that crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in
a systematic manner or on a large scale deserve higher sentences than “ordinary”
war crimes has become a matter of profound controversy within the ICTY.116 In
its judgment in the sentencing appeal in Prosecutor v. Tadić, the Appeals
Chamber found that “there is in law no distinction between the seriousness of a
crime against humanity and that of a war crime,” basing its opinion exclusively
on the ICTY Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence.117 Jan Nemitz
109

Serushago, supra note 33, ¶¶ 14–15.
See, e.g., Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 14; Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 14.
111
Tadić, supra note 11, ¶¶ 1, 16 (separate opinion of Judge Cassese); Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 14; see
also id., ¶ 43 (noting that crimes against humanity “are . . . offences of the gravest kind against the life and
liberty of the human being”); Erdemović, supra note 105, ¶¶ 20–25; Furundžiya, supra note 80, ¶ 8 (declaration
of Vorah, J.); King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 322, 333-34; Frulli, supra note 106, at 335; id., at 349 (concluding
that crimes against humanity are more serious than war crimes); Ambos, supra note 100, at 33–34.
112
Flavia Lattanzi, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes in the Jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION
OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 473, 497 (Horst Fischer, Claus Kress &
Sascha Rolf Lüder eds., 2001).
113
Tadić, supra note 11, ¶ 7.
114
Id. ¶ 10.
115
Id. ¶ 15; see also Ambos, supra note 100, at 34.
116
See generally, Lattanzi, supra note 112, at 498–503; Nemitz, supra note 3, at 618–20.
117
Tadić, supra note 11, ¶ 69 (majority opinion); see also Tadić, supra note 11 (separate opinion of
Shahabuddeen, J.); Tadić, supra note 8, at 3 (separate opinion of Robinson, J.); Erdemović, supra note 105,
¶¶ 19–23, 26; Erdemović, supra note 25, at 2 (separate opinion of Shahabuddeen, J.); Blaškić, supra note 1,
¶ 804; Furundžiya, supra note 80, ¶¶ 241–42, 247; Krnojelać, supra note 14, ¶ 511; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 32.
110
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maintained that war crimes can, in given circumstances, be as serious, or even
more serious, that crimes against humanity, mentioning the example of the
intentional killing of prisoners of war as part of a widespread practice and
involving state authorities.118 In Prosecutor v. Blaškić, the Trial Chamber noted
that the ICTY has not yet established a hierarchy of gravity of the crimes within
its jurisdiction and therefore decided to “confine itself to assessing [for
sentencing purposes] seriousness based on the circumstances of the case.”119
It stands to reason that, within the realm of war crimes, grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and Protocol I to those Conventions
should not per se be treated as more serious than the ones not stipulated as grave
breaches, and that the gravity of a war crime should also not be assessed in view
of the distinction between international armed conflicts and armed conflicts not
of an international character.120
A factor taken into account as an element of crime A can be considered as
an aggravating factor for crime B, of which it is not an element.121 Humiliation
as an element of the crime of humiliating and degrading treatment can therefore
be considered as an aggravating circumstance following a concurrent conviction
of rape, of which it is not a constituent element.122 In Prosecutor v. Češić, the
Sentencing Tribunal declined to consider exacerbated humiliation twice, namely
as an element of a war crime and of the corresponding crime against humanity,
and decided in all fairness to impose a single sentence for which it considered
the degree of humiliation only once in its final determination of an appropriate
sentence.123

2. The Manner in Which the Crime Was Executed
Gravity of a crime can also emerge from the manner in which the offence
was executed.124 The ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence refer to “the nature
of the unlawful behaviour and the means employed to execute the crime” as a
sentencing factor that applies in general,125 and to “[c]ommission of the crime

118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125

Nemitz, supra note 3, at 618.
Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶¶ 800–03.
Schabas, supra note 25, at 1507.
Vasiljević, supra note 80, ¶ 172; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 53.
Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 53.
Id. ¶ 54.
See Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 186.
RPE, supra note 86, Rule 145(1)(c).
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with particular cruelty” that has to be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.126
The heinous means used for the killing of victims of the crime was specially
mentioned as an aggravating sentencing factor in Prosecutor v. Kayishema.127
In Prosecutor v. Jelesić, the ICTY held out “the repugnant, bestial and sadistic
nature” of the accused’s conduct and the “cold-blooded commission of murders
and mistreatment of people” as contingencies that warrant severe punishment.128
In Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, the ICTR stated that at the “upper end of the
sentencing scale” are “those who commit[ ]crimes with especial zeal or
sadism.”129 In Prosecutor v. Češić, the Sentencing Tribunal referred to the
“exacerbat[ing] humiliation and degradation, depravity and sadistic behaviour”
of the accused as aggravating factors.130
In the Tadić sentencing judgment, the Trial Chamber took into
consideration, as an aggravating circumstance, the convicted person’s
“awareness of, and enthusiastic support for” the atrocities upon which his
conviction was based.131 In the Čelibići case, the Trial Chamber found the “most
disturbing, serious and thus, [] aggravating aspect” of the criminal acts was that
the accused “apparently enjoyed using this [electric shock] device upon his
helpless victims,”132 and referred to the manner in which the crimes were
committed as “indicative of a sadistic individual who, at times, displayed a total
disregard for the sanctity of human life and dignity.”133
3. The Motive of the Perpetrator
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence also list, as an aggravating
circumstance, “any motive involving discrimination” on grounds such as “. . .

126

Id. Rule 145(2)(b)(iv).
Kayishema, supra note 25, at ¶ 18.
128
Jelisić (T), supra note 80, ¶ 86.
129
Ntakirutimana, supra note 90, ¶ 884; see also Tadić (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 96, ¶ 69;
Delalić, supra note 7, ¶¶ 1264, 1268, 1274–1275; Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 783; Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 874;
Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 486 (May 16, 2003); Nahimana,
supra note 78, ¶ 1097; Gatete, supra note 78, ¶ 680.
130
Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 53; see also Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1262 (referring to “not only the inherent
suffering involved in rape, but exacerbat[ing] her [the victim’s] humiliation and degradation by raping her in the
presence of his [the convicted person’s] colleagues.”).
131
Tadić, supra note 96, ¶ 57; see also Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1227.
132
Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1264; see also Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 193.
133
Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1268; see also Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 193.
127
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age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national,
ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status.”134
A discriminatory motive has also been endorsed as an aggravating
circumstance in the ad hoc Tribunals.135 In Prosecutor v. Tadić, ethnic and
religious discrimination and nationalistic sentiments were mentioned by
name.136 In Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, the Trial and the Appeals Chambers laid
special stress on verbal abuse as an aggravating factor.137
In the Čelebići case, a Trial Chamber of the ICTY was quite correct in
saying: “Motive is not an essential ingredient of liability for the commission of
an offence. It is to some extent a necessary factor in the determination of
sentence after guilt has been established.”138
If the perpetrator committed the offence with “cold, calculated
premeditation, suggestive of revenge against the individual victim or group to
which the victim belongs,” this should be taken into account as an aggravating
circumstance, but if he or she committed the offence “reluctantly and under the
influence of group pressure and, in addition, demonstrated compassion toward
the victim or the group to which the victim belongs,” this must be taken into
account in mitigation of sentence.139 Tolerance and lack of bigotry will also
count in mitigation of a sentence.140 In Erdemović, the accused actually saved a
victim’s life, and this counted to his credit in sentencing.141
4. Harmful Consequences of the Criminal Act
Cruelty of the criminal act is closely related to the harmful consequences of
an offense, which has also been singled out as an element that falls under the
nature of the crime as a sentencing directive.142 The link appears from a
statement in the sentencing judgment of Duško Tadić, where the ICTY referred

134

Compare RPE, supra note 86, Rule 145(2)(b)(v), with ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(3).
Vasiljević, supra note 80, ¶ 172; see also Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1269; Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 784.
136
Tadić, supra note 96, ¶ 55; see also Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 867.
137
Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Judgment, ¶ 276 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2002); Vasiljević, supra note 80, ¶ 161.
138
Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1235; see also Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 250,
272 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
139
Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1235; see also Krstić, supra note 80, ¶ 711.
140
Erdemović (Second Sentencing Judgement), supra note 25, ¶ 16(i) (under Character).
141
Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶¶ 105, 107.
142
King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 322; see also Tadić, supra note 8, ¶ 70; Erdemović, supra note 11,
¶ 20; Delalić, supra note 7, ¶¶ 1225, 1260, 1273; Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Sentence,
¶ 16 (May 21, 1999).
135
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in one breath to the cruelty of the act and the humiliation suffered by the victim
as aggravating sentencing factors.143 The ICC’s Rules of Procedure and
Evidence speak of “the extent of the damage caused, in particular the harm
caused to victims and their families,”144 and also, as an aggravating
circumstance, of “[c]ommission of the crime where the victim is particularly
defenceless.”145 It furthermore singles out “[c]ommission of the crime . . . where
there were multiple victims” as a matter of aggravation.146
The number of victims killed would clearly come within the confines of the
above directives.147 But it goes beyond that. In the Čelebići Case, the Trial
Chamber called gravity of an offense the “touchstone of sentencing,” and noted
that gravity includes the impact of the crime on victims.148 It made special
mention of the “substantial pain, suffering and injury” inflicted by the
perpetrator upon each of his victims, and the “permanent physical and
psychological scars” that resulted from the cruelty to which they were
exposed.149 In Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljević, the Trial Chamber mentioned as
sentencing guidelines, alongside “the nature of the act or omission” and “the
context in which it occurred, the personal circumstances of the victim including
age, sex and health, as well as the physical, mental and moral effects of the act
upon the victim,” and the fact that the criminal act had long-term effects.150
In the sentencing policy articulated in the case of Prosecutor v. Furundžiya,
the Trial Chamber laid special stress on “the severe physical pain and great
emotional trauma that Witness A has had to suffer as a consequence of these
depraved acts committed against her.”151 The Tribunal had noted that the victim
“was a civilian detainee and at the complete mercy of her captors.”152 In
143
Tadić, supra note 8, ¶ 22; see also Prosecutor v. Todorović, Case No. IT-95-9/1-S, Sentencing
Judgment, ¶¶ 63–65 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2001).
144
RPE, supra note 86, Rule 145(1)(c).
145
Id. Rule 145(2)(b)(iii).
146
Id. Rule 145(2)(b)(iv).
147
Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶ 15; Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 866; Krstić, supra note 80, ¶ 701; Češić,
supra note 9, ¶ 32; Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 337–38 (May 20, 2005);
Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 440 (Dec. 13, 2005); Prosecutor v.
Serugendo, Case No. ICTR-2005-84-I, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 90 (June 12, 2006); Ndindabahizi v.
Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-71-A, Judgment, ¶ 135 (Jan. 16, 2007); Prosecutor v. Rugambarara, Case No.
ICTR-00-59-T, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 24 (Nov. 16, 2007); Prosecutor v. Karera, Case No. ICTR-01-74-T,
Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 579 (Dec. 7, 2007); Prosecutor v. Bagosora & others, supra note 78, ¶ 2272; Gatete,
supra note 78, ¶ 679.
148
Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1260; see also Krstić, supra note 80, ¶ 701; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 32.
149
Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1273; see also Tadić, supra note 8, ¶ 56.
150
Vasiljević, supra note 137, ¶ 235; see also Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶¶ 200–05.
151
Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 287.
152
Id., ¶ 283.
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Prosecutor v. Banović, the Sentencing Trial Chamber made special mention of
the fact that the prison victims “were particularly vulnerable, frightened and
isolated individuals,” and accepted “the position of inferiority and the
vulnerability of the victims” as “relevant factors in assessing the gravity of the
offence.”153
In Prosecutor v. Blaškić, the Trial Chamber also emphasized, as an
aggravating circumstance, “the physical or emotional scars borne by the victims,
their suffering at the loss of loved ones and the fact that most of them are still
unable to return to their homes to this day.”154 The Tribunal was particularly
sensitive to the fact that victims were members of the civilian population and
included women and children.155 In Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, the victims
included women, children, the elderly, and persons in captivity, and their
vulnerability and position of helplessness were taken into account as aggravating
factors.156 In Prosecutor v. Kunarać, special significance was attached for
sentencing purposes to the fact that several of the sexual assault victims were
young.157 Several judgments emphasized, as an aggravating circumstance, the
fact that victims at the time of the trial still suffered from the trauma brought
upon them by the perpetrators’ criminal conduct.158 It has further been noted by
one analyst that “the gravity of a crime is not only affected by the actual harm,
but also by the danger caused to other legal values, i.e. the potential harm that
may result from the offense.”159
It has been held that for sentencing purposes, victims are not to be confined
to those directly affected by the crime but may also include their next-of-kin.160
This proposition has subsequently been challenged. In Prosecutor v. Krnojelać,
the ICTY noted that effects of an offence on relatives—or friends—of the
immediate victims have no bearing on the criminal culpability of the convicted
person and, therefore, “it would be unfair to consider such effects in determining
a sentence.”161 The ICTY subsequently changed its mind by holding that the

153
Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 50; see also Kunarać, supra note 5, at ¶ 352; Prosecutor v. Simić, Case No.
IT-95-9/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 17, 2002); Obrenović,
supra note 9, ¶¶ 102–03; Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 184.
154
Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 787.
155
Id. ¶ 786; see also Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 867; Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 213(iv).
156
Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 137.
157
Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶¶ 835, 864, 879.
158
Vasiljević, supra note 137, ¶ 276; Vasiljević, supra note 80, ¶¶ 164–66; Krnojelać, supra note 14,
¶ 144.
159
Nemitz, supra note 3, 617.
160
Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1226.
161
Krnojelać, supra note 14, at ¶ 512; see also Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 852.
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impact of an offense on the relatives and friends of the victims may be taken into
account for sentencing purposes,162 for example in the case of murder and sexual
assault.163
It should finally be noted that compassion shown, and assistance rendered
by an accused to certain victims can also serve as a mitigating factor.164 The
ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence expressly mention “efforts by the
person to compensate the victims” as a mitigating circumstance.165
5. Participation of the Accused in the Criminal Conduct
The ICC’S Rules of Procedure and Evidence refer to “the degree of
participation of the convicted person” in the offense of which he or she was
convicted, and to “the degree of intent” as factors to be considered for sentencing
purposes.166
There are thus many sides to the personal conduct and dispensation of the
convicted person that should weigh with international tribunals in assessing an
appropriate sentence on basis of the principles of retributive justice. Some of the
personal factors that are to be considered relevant for achieving proportionality
between the crime and the sentence derive from the participation of the
convicted person in the crime and are objective in nature, while others may be
defined as subjective attributes of the convicted person. Those subjective factors
will be considered hereafter under the heading of Retributive Justice.
The objective standards attending conduct of the accused again fall into two
main categories: (1) personal responsibilities of the person, and (2) the form of
perpetration for which he or she was held responsible.
Several judgments of the ad hoc Tribunals stressed the status of the person
within the community as an aggravating circumstance.167 It has been decided,
for example, that “[a]buse of positions of authority or trust is generally
considered an aggravating factor,”168 and even that a command position deserves
162
Prosecutor v. Krnojelać, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgment, ¶ 260 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Sept. 17, 2003); see also Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 38.
163
Češić, supra note 9, ¶¶ 39, 44.
164
See infra Section D.2(c).
165
RPE, supra note 86, Rule 145(2)(a)(ii).
166
Id. Rule 145(1)(c).
167
See generally Serushago, supra note 33, ¶¶ 28–29; Kayishema, supra note 142, ¶ 15; Kordić, supra
note 54, ¶ 847; Serugendo, supra note 147, ¶ 90; Nemitz, supra note 3, 612.
168
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 44 (Sept. 4, 1998); see also Kayishema, supra note 142, ¶ 26;
Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1220; Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence,
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a higher sentence than direct participation in the crime.169 Particularly critical in
this regard is the position occupied by an accused in the organizational hierarchy
of the prevailing power structures.170 As stated in the Čelebići Case: “It would
constitute a travesty of justice, and an abuse of the concept of command
authority, to allow the calculated dereliction of an essential duty to operate as a
factor in mitigation of criminal responsibility.”171
In Prosecutor v. Kambanda, the fact that the accused was Prime Minister of
Rwanda was accordingly taken into consideration as an aggravating factor.172 In
the Čelibići Case, the ICTY made something of the fact that it was dealing with
high-ranking political officials and military officers,173 and also took a grim view
of the fact that one of the accused was deputy commander of the prison camp
where the atrocities were committed.174 In Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, special
mention was made, as an aggravating circumstance, of the accused having held
a high-ranking position in the civil service.175 In Prosecutor v. Todorović, the
superior position of the accused as Chief of Police was considered an
aggravating factor.176 In Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletelić & Vinco Martinović,
the Trial Chamber noted that the accused was “something of a legend in the
region” and that his “command role . . . is [therefore] an aggravating factor.”177
Mrs. Biljana Plavšić was at the time the crime was committed President of the
Republic of Srpska and her “high leadership position” led the Court to decide
that “misplaced leniency would not be fitting and that a substantial sentence of
imprisonment is called for.”178 The Sentencing Tribunal did, on the other hand,
decide that the fact that “witnesses . . . of high international reputation”––
including United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, President of
Sweden Carl Bildt, and Head of the Mission of the Organization for Society and
Co-operation in Europe Robert Frowick––came forward to testify on her behalf,
¶¶ 1003–04 (Jan. 27, 2000); Sikirica, supra note 80, ¶¶ 172, 210.
169
Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 791; see also id. at ¶ 768.
170
See, e.g., Tadić, supra note 8, ¶ 60; Rutaganda, supra note 61, ¶¶ 50, 451, 469; Blaškić, supra note 1,
¶ 788; Kordić, supra note 54, ¶ 847; Todorović, supra note 143, ¶ 60–62; Krstić , supra note 80, ¶ 708; Sikirica,
supra note 80, ¶ 140; Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶ 60; Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 99; Gatete, supra note 78, ¶ 678.
171
Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1250; see also Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 187.
172
Kambanda, supra note 168, ¶ 61.
173
Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1234.
174
Id., ¶ 1268; see also Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶¶ 193–94, 213 (iii).
175
Kamuhanda, supra note 53, ¶ 764.
176
Todorović, supra note 143, ¶¶ 59, 66.
177
Prosecutor v. Naletelić, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, ¶ 751 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003).
178
Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶ 60; see also Renzaho, supra note 78, ¶ 824 (the Sentencing Tribunal affording
only “very limited weight” to the convicted person’s lengthy public service and assistance rendered by him to
the Tutsi victim group).
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and her post-conflict role in ensuring that the Dayton Accord was accepted and
implemented in the Republic of Srpska,179 added “much weight to the plea in
mitigation put forward in this regard.”180 She was seventy-two years old at the
time and was sentenced to eleven years imprisonment for her “participation in a
crime of utmost gravity” (persecution).181
Of special significance in regard to war crimes is the position of the Accused
in the chain of command.182 In Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, the Appeals Chamber
decided that the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber was “manifestly
inadequate” because, amongst other things, the sentencing Tribunal failed to
treat the position of the convicted person as a commander as an aggravating
circumstance.183 In Prosecutor v. Tadić, on the other hand, the Appeals Chamber
decided that a sentence in excess of twenty years imprisonment on any counts
in the indictment would be excessive because the level in the command structure
of the accused was low.184 In the Čelebići Case, the ICTY regarded the fact that
a commanding officer only had constructive knowledge of the criminal act (he
did not know but should have known) as a potential mitigating factor.185
It should be emphasized, though, that a position of authority should not, in
and of itself, attract a harsher sentence; it is the abuse or wrongful exercise of a
position of authority that serves as an aggravating factor.186 The principle of
“graduation of sentence”––that is, the rule that “the most senior levels of the
command structure should attract the severest sentences, with less severe
sentences for those lower down the structure”187––is therefore “not absolute.”188

179

Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶¶ 85–94.
Id., ¶ 94.
181
Id., ¶¶ 132, 134.
182
See, e.g., Kupreškić, supra note 9, ¶ 862; Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 184; Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 847;
Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 863; Musema, supra note 168, ¶¶ 381, 382.
183
Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 187.
184
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-Abis, Judgment in Sentencing Appeals, ¶¶ 55–57
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 26, 2000); see also Kordić, supra note 54, ¶ 847.
185
Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1250; see also Schabas, supra note 25, at 1522 (noting that command
responsibility is based on negligence).
186
Krstić, supra note 80, ¶ 709; Kayishema, supra note 89, ¶ 358; Prosecutor v. Elizaphan, Case No.
ICTR-96-10-A & ICTR-96-17-A, Judgment, ¶ 563 (Dec. 13, 2004); Prosecutor v. Babić, Case No. IT-03-72-A,
¶ 80 (July 18, 2005); Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-A, Judgment, ¶ 347 (Sept. 19, 2005);
Stakić, supra note 34, at ¶ 411; Ndindabahizi, supra note 147, ¶ 136; Simba v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR01-76-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 284–85 (Nov. 27, 2007); Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, Judgment,
¶ 230 (Mar. 12, 2008); Hadžihasanović, supra note 34, ¶ 320; Renzaho, supra note 78, at ¶ 823; Gatete, supra
note 78, ¶ 678.
187
Musema, supra note 168, ¶ 382.
188
Hadžihasanović, supra note 34, ¶ 321.
180
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Also at the objective level, emphasis is placed on the form and degree of
participation in the crime.189 Playing a leading role in the execution of atrocities
clearly serves as an aggravating circumstance,190 while those not playing a
significant role in the commission of an offense should receive lighter
sentences.191 The Trial Court is required to reflect on the sentence imposed, “the
predominant standard of proportionality between the gravity of the offence and
the degree of responsibility of the offender.”192
A distinction can therefore be made for sentencing purposes between
principal perpetrators and accessories, on the understanding that the latter group
is entitled to lighter sentences.193 Inchoate participation, such as an attempt to
commit the crime, is generally treated for sentencing purposes as being of a less
serious nature.194 Merely aiding and abetting has generally been considered as
warranting a reduced level of criminal responsibility.195 In Prosecutor v.
Aleksovski, the Trial Chamber gave the accused credit for the fact that his “direct
participation in the commission of the acts of violence was relatively limited.”196
In Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, the ICTR stated that those who planned or
ordered the atrocities deserved the highest penalties.197
It should be noted, though, that in some instances not playing an active role
in the execution of a crime is inherent in the criminal conduct (the crime of which
the accused was found guilty) and should therefore not be taken into account as
a mitigating circumstance. In Prosecutor v. Vincent Rutaganira, for example,
the accused pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, complicity by an omission
in the crime of extermination (not intervening to stop massive killings and
injuring of Tutsi who had taken refuge in a church building in a district where
the accused was an elected Counselor). In considering an appropriate sentence,
189
Kupreškić, supra note 9, ¶ 852; Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 182; Delalić, supra note 34, ¶ 731; Jelisić,
supra note 80, ¶ 101; Stakić, supra note 9, ¶ 903; Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 50; Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 144;
Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶¶ 154, 156.
190
Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 19; Rutaganda, supra note 61, ¶ 470; Radoslav Brdanin, Case No. IT-0036-A, ¶ 413 (Apr. 3, 2007); Bagosora, supra note 78, ¶ 2272; Gatete, supra note 78, ¶ 680.
191
See Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 236; Krnojelać, supra note 14, ¶ 509; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 156.
192
Akayesu, supra note 53, Sentence, ¶ 40, cited with approval by the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgment, ¶ 414 (June 1, 2001); see also Dragan Nikolić, supra note 34,
¶ 144; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 154.
193
See, e.g., Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶ 49; see also id., ¶¶ 77–79 (noting that the accused did not personally
commit any of the acts of violence); Ambos, supra note 100, at 33.
194
Schabas, supra note 25, at 1507.
195
Vasiljević, supra note 80, ¶ 182; Krstić , supra note 80, ¶¶ 251, 266, 268; Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case
No. ICTR-98-44A-T, ¶ 963 (Dec. 1, 2003) (noting that an “indirect form of participation” such as incitement to
commit genocide and aiding and abetting warrants a lesser sentence).
196
Aleksovski, supra note 11, ¶ 236; see also Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 156.
197
Ntakirutimana, supra note 90, ¶ 884.
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the Chamber noted that not participating in the actual killings “goes to his
criminal conduct rather than to mitigation.”198
Closely related is the supposition that persons acting upon the orders of a
superior official should receive a lighter sentence. The Statutes of the ad hoc
Tribunals expressly state that acting “pursuant to an order of a Government or
of a superior shall not relieve . . . [the accused person] of criminal responsibility,
but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if . . . justice so requires.”199
The principle has been applied in several judgments of the ad hoc Tribunals.200
In terms of the ICC Statute, superior orders will, to the contrary, in certain
limited circumstances exclude criminal liability, namely if the perpetrator was
under a legal obligation to obey the order, did not know that the order was
unlawful, and the order was not manifestly unlawful.201 Nothing is provided in
the ICC Statute as to the mitigating effect on sentencing of superior orders that
fall short of these requirements. Although some analysts maintain that superior
orders will be treated as a mitigating circumstance by the ICC,202 it is equally
reasonable to assume that acting upon a superior order which the perpetrator was
not obliged to obey, or which he or she did not know was unlawful, or which
was as a matter of fact manifestly unlawful, should not serve as a mitigating
circumstance.
Although the ICTY in Furundžiya subscribed to the principle that those not
acting as principal perpetrators deserve lighter sentences,203 the Tribunal did
judge the accused, being an aider and abettor,204 harshly for his “active role as a
commander of the Jokers,”205 the Jokers being a special unit of the military
police responsible for the atrocities in issue in that case. In the Čelebići Case,
the Appeals Chamber decided that in certain circumstances the gravity of the
crime might be so great that a very severe penalty is to be imposed in spite of

198

Rutaganira, supra note 13, ¶¶ 137–38.
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL, art. 6(4), annex of the Report of the SecretaryGeneral Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1192
(1993); STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, art. 5(4), annex of S.C. Res. 955 (1994),
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1602 (1994).
200
Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶¶ 15, 20, 53; see also Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1281 (declining to take
superior orders into account as a mitigating factor because the accused executed the orders without reluctance
and in fact took some pleasure in the infliction of pain and suffering on the victims).
201
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 33.
202
See, e.g., King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 335.
203
Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 281.
204
Id., ¶ 282.
205
Id., ¶ 283.
199
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the fact that the accused did not occupy a senior position in the overall command
structure.206
In the second sentencing judgment in the case of Erdemović, the ICTY
accepted duress as an extenuating circumstance, describing the accused as “the
helpless victim” with “no choice in taking part in the Srebrenica operations,” but
also at times risking his life by breaking out of “this chain of helplessness” and
actually refusing to kill some members of the target group.207 In Prosecutor v.
Blaškić, a Trial Chamber of the ICTY observed that duress can only be
considered as an extenuating circumstance if the convicted person “had no
choice or moral freedom in committing the crime.”208 It should be noted that
duress deriving from superior orders can in exceptional circumstances be so
severe as to leave the subordinate without any freedom of choice, in which event
it would not only serve as an extenuating circumstance but become a ground of
justification that would warrant a finding of not guilty.
The judgment of the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Blaškić also makes
instructive reading in the present context:
The fact that the accused did not directly participate may be taken as a
mitigating circumstance when the accused held a junior position
within the civilian or military command structure. However, the Trial
Chamber considers that the fact that commanders . . . played no direct
part cannot act in mitigation of the sentence when found guilty.209

Theories of retribution are mostly founded on the premise that “offenders
deserve to suffer and that the institution of punishment should reflect the
suffering they deserve.”210 Retributive theories assert that “punishment must be
equivalent to the level of wrongdoing.”211
In undiluted form, retribution may be likened to retaliation, or punishment
in kind. Based on the teachings of the celebrated mathematician, Pythagoras
(circa 540–504 B.C.), the lex talionis accordingly required an arithmetical
206
Delalić, supra note 34, ¶ 847; see also Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 858; Vasiljević, supra note 80, ¶ 301;
Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 45; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 32.
207
Erdemović, supra note 25, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 17; see also Erdemović, supra note 11, Sentencing
Judgment, ¶¶ 16-20, 54, 89; Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1283; Rutaganira, supra note 13, ¶ 161.
208
Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 769; see Omar Serushago v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-39-A, ¶ 27 (Apr.
6, 2001) (The Appeals Chamber of the ICTR not accepting duress as an extenuating circumstance because it was
neither alleged nor proven at trial.).
209
Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 768; see also Vasiljević, supra note 137, ¶¶ 301-05 (deciding that the fact that
the accused was a low-level offender did not alter the seriousness of his crime).
210
Bagaric & Amarasekara, supra note 18, at 127.
211
See id. at 157.
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equilibrium between the wrongful act and retributive punishment in accordance
with the classical adage: “an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth.”212 This
approach was characteristic of “primitive” societies, where the kind and
measurements of punishment were exclusively based on the nature and gravity
of the criminal act.213 As noted by one analyst, “no one regards raping a rapist,
or torturing a torturer, as appropriate punishment today.”214 The idea of
retribution being a matter of retaliation, or at least remnants of that idea,
regrettably, still lingers on in many contemporary systems of criminal law, and
in the minds of many people. When an outraged community calls for justice,
they mostly seek revenge.
But retribution is not revenge.215 The harm suffered which triggered acts of
revenge are not necessarily wrongful acts in the legal sense; revenge is not
necessarily commensurate with the harm caused by the act being revenged; a
revenge-inspired act does not set a precedent for similar responses to the same
kind of harmful acts; the victims of revenge are not necessarily confined to the
person whose conduct sparked the retaliatory response, but could for example
include a spouse, child or relative of that person; the person taking revenge often
derives pleasure from suffering of the other; and revenge is personal in the sense
that the avenger is typically the person wronged.216
To be “just deserts,” retribution‒‒as we have seen‒‒must be “proportional
to the gravity of the crime and the moral guilt of the convicted.”217 The “just
desert” theory “places the requirement of justice, rather than the pursuit of crime
prevention, at the foundation of the general justification for criminal
sanctions.”218 That is to say, judicial response to a criminal act must be
conditioned by the demands of retributive justice, which, among other things,
make criminal liability dependent on the subjective culpability or
blameworthiness of the accused.219 Retributive justice requires (a) making a
212
See Leviticus 24:19-20: “If a man injures his neighbor, what he has done must be done to him: broken
limb for broken limb, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. As the injury inflicted, so must be the injury suffered.”
213
F.J. van Zyl & J.D. van der Vyver, Inleiding tot die Regswetenskap, 228–29. Durban: Butterworths
(1982).
214
Eric Blumenson, The Challenge of a Global Standard of Justice: Peace, Pluralism, and Punishment at
the International Criminal Court, 44 COL. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 801, 840 (2006).
215
Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 185; see also Kordić, supra note 54, ¶ 847; Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 34;
Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 150; King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 330.
216
See Bagaric & Amarasekara, supra note 18, at 163–64.
217
Supra, the text accompanying notes 10–11.
218
Beresford, supra note 24, at 40.
219
See Kabashi, supra note 34, ¶ 11 (noting that a sentence must “properly reflect[] the personal
culpability of the wrongdoer”); Bemba Gombo, supra note 9, ¶ 12; Frulli, supra note 106, at 336 (noting that
the mental element influences the gravity of a crime); Nemitz, supra note 3, at 616 (noting that gravity of a crime
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conviction for criminal conduct dependent on fault in the form of dolus (intent)
or culpa (negligence) on the part of the perpetrator; and (b) taking into account,
for sentencing purposes, reduced culpability of the offender.220
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence accordingly instruct the ICC to take
into account for purposes of sentencing “the degree of intent” of the person
concerned.221 Committing the crime “knowingly and with premeditation”
therefore deserves to be severely punished.222
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence mention in their list of mitigating
circumstances those “falling short of constituting grounds for exclusion of
criminal responsibility, such as substantially diminished mental capacity or
duress.”223 Requiring that diminished mental capacity must be “substantial” is
perhaps unfortunate, since every manifestation of reduced culpability, provided
it is real, should serve as a consideration for the reduction of sentence. Grounds
for reduced culpability include subjective attributes of the perpetrator which do
not altogether exclude his or her capacity to form a criminal intent or negligent
disposition but nevertheless diminished his or her ability to appreciate the
wrongfulness of the criminal act or to act in accordance with that insight.
It should in the present context be emphasized that personal attributes of the
accused do not in all instances have an impact on mens rea but could still serve
as extenuating or aggravating factors for sentencing purposes. In Prosecutor v.
Furundžiya, for example, the Tribunal was not concerned with the question of
reduced culpability when considered the young age of the accused (23 years at
the time the offence was committed) to be a mitigating circumstance.224 Mental
capacity per se was also not the issue when the Trial Chamber, in Prosecutor v.
Goran Jelesić, decided that “Judges cannot accord too great a weight” to
personal attributes of the convicted person, such as age (he was twenty-two years
old when the crime was committed), no previous convictions for any violent
crime, and being the father of a young child,225 and, perhaps more puzzling, that
the fact the he suffered from “personality disorders, [and] had borderline

derives from (a) the actus reus (harmfulness of the offence), and (b) mens rea (culpability of the offender));
Peglau, supra note 2, at 143 (noting that “the sentence must not exceed the culpability of the criminal”).
220
Peglau, supra note 2, at 143, 147.
221
RPE, supra note 86, Rule 145(1)(c); see also King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 332 (including under
the rubric of gravity of the offence, the “types of intent”).
222
See Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 61.
223
RPE, supra note 86, Rule 145(2)(a)(i).
224
Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 283; see also Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 39 (where the convicted person
was thirty-seven years old at the time the crime was committed).
225
Jelisić, supra note 80, ¶ 124.
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narcissistic and anti-social characteristics” did not diminish his criminal
responsibility.226
In Prosecutor v. Todorović, conflicting reports of psychiatrist as to the
alleged post-traumatic stress disorder of the accused were presented to the Trial
Chamber. This is a matter of mens rea. The Tribunal proceeded on the
assumption that the onus rested on the accused to prove on a balance of
probabilities his or her grounds of diminished culpability,227 and consequently
declined to take the mental condition of the accused into account as a ground in
mitigation of sentence.228 It must be emphasized, with acclamation, that the ICC
cannot possible follow this same approach. In terms of the ICC Statute, an
accused has the right “[n]ot to have imposed on him or her any reversal of the
burden of proof or any onus of rebuttal.”229 If the accused should raise any of
the grounds of diminished culpability, the onus to disprove the same rests
squarely on the Prosecutor and the Trial Chamber must be satisfied, above
reasonable doubt, that the grounds relied on by the accused did not exist at the
time the crime was committed.
IV. EXTENUATING AND AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
When one considers the gravity of a crime and conduct of the perpetrator as
components of the concept of retribution, their impact on sentencing already
emerges. It is perhaps wrong to think of the impact of the nature of the crime
and the means of perpetration of the person concerned on sentencing in terms of
extenuating or aggravating circumstances. Here the nature and magnitude of a
particular sentence derives from considerations inherent in the crime as such as
conditioned by culpability of the Accused on the basis of retributive justice.
The same is true in regard to the general functions of punishment, which in
a very limited sense might influence a sentencing judge to decide on a particular
kind and measure of punishment to be imposed. Extenuating and aggravating
circumstances embrace additional factors attending the commission of a crime,
not part of the criminal act per se, which ought to influence the decision to
impose a lighter or a heavier sentence, as the case might be.230 That, perhaps, is
what the ICTY had in mind when it proclaimed that “[m]itigation of punishment

226

Id., ¶ 125.
Todorović, supra note 10, ¶ 93; see also Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1172.
228
Todorović, supra note 10, ¶ 95.
229
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 67(1)(c)(i).
230
See Stakić, supra note 9, ¶ 920 (noting that “mitigating circumstances may also include those not
related to the offence”); see also Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 145; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 155.
227
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in no way reduces the gravity of the crime or the guilty verdict against a
convicted person.”231
Since the same factor can warrant a lighter or a heavier sentence, it is perhaps
inappropriate to put a particular factor in the one, and the other in another
basket.232 Proposals to this effect were not accepted by the Preparatory
Commission of the ICC responsible for the drafting of the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence.
In Prosecutor v. Erdemović, the Trial Chamber distinguished between
mitigating circumstances that existed at the time the crime was committed and
those that emerged after the crime was committed.233 This distinction is of value
for purposes of classification only. The suggestion that it might have been
intended to separate the ones that have an influence on the gravity of the offence
from those that do not,234 is not tenable. Some of the extenuating and aggravating
circumstances that existed at the time the crime was committed are quite
unrelated to the severity of the crime.
There is an important aspect of the Todorović judgment which merits special
attention and should be emphasized before particular extenuating and
aggravating circumstances can be scrutinized in greater detail. In cases where a
factor that might be considered as an aggravating circumstance constitutes an
element of the crime, it should not be treated separately as an aggravating
circumstance.235 It therefore makes no sense to proclaim as a supposed
aggravating circumstance for sentencing purposes that the convicted person

231

Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶ 80; Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶¶ 37, 56; see also Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 224.
See Peglau, supra note 2, at 146.
233
Erdemović, supra note, ¶ 86.
234
See Nemitz, supra note 3, at 608.
235
Todorović, supra note 143, ¶ 57; see also Prosecutor v. Kunarać, IT-96-23-T, Judgment, ¶ 852 (Feb.
22, 2001); Krnojelać, supra note 14, ¶ 517 ; Vasiljević, supra note 137, ¶ 277; Stakić, supra note 9, ¶ 904;
Prosecutor v. Banović, IT-02-65/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 53 (Oct. 28, 2003); Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 144;
Prosecutor v. Obrenović, IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 99 (Dec. 10, 2003); Vasiljević, supra note 80,
¶ 17–72; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 53; Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, IT-95-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 693 (July 29, 2004);
Prosecutor v. Deronjić, IT-02-61-A, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, ¶¶ 106, 127 (July 20, 2005); Prosecutor
v. Momir Nikolić, IT-02-60/1-A, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, ¶ 44 (Mar. 8, 2006); Ndindabahizi, supra
note 147, ¶ 137 (Jan. 16, 2007); Prosecutor v. Renzaho, ICTR-97-31-T, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 822 (July 14,
2009); Gatete, supra note 78, ¶ 677; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ¶ 35 (Mar. 14, 2012);
Prosecutor v. Dordević, IT-05-87/1-A, Judgment, ¶936 (Feb. 23, 2011); Nzabonimana v. The Prosecutor, ICTR98-44D-A, Judgment, ¶ 464 (Sept. 29, 2014); Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, ICTR-98-42-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 3356,
3385 (June 24, 2011).
232
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“knowingly and consciously,”236 or “voluntarily,”237 participated in the
commission of the crime, since intentional and voluntary perpetration are
already included in the concept of fault as an element of criminal liability.238
In the case of persecution, for example, a discriminatory intent is a basic
element of the crime and should therefore not be given additional weight for
purposes of sentencing; and the same applies to the fact that the crime was
committed against members of the civilian population.239 A discriminatory
intent can be considered an aggravating factor of crimes against humanity other
than persecution,240 for example in the case of murder as a crime against
humanity.241 It has therefore also been decided that premeditation should not be
taken into account for purposes of sentencing upon a conviction for crimes
against humanity.242
It is on the other hand quite feasible and appropriate to take willing
participation in the crime,243 or premeditation,244 into account as an aggravating
circumstance. Premeditation is the opposite of spontaneity. If a person commits
a crime after having considered the consequences of his or her act, he or she is
clearly more blameworthy than someone who acts on the spur of the moment.
It simply remains to state, by way of introduction, that the weight to be
afforded to aggravating and extenuating circumstances is within the discretion
of the Sentencing Tribunal.245 The burden of proof of aggravating circumstances

236

Rutaganda, supra note 61, ¶ 50; see also Prosecutor v. Serushago, ICTR 98-39-S, Sentence, ¶ 30 (Feb.

5, 1999).
237
Kayishema & Ruzindana, supra note 89, ¶ 26; see also Prosecutor v. Krstić, IT-98-33-T, Judgment,
¶ 721 (Int’l Trib. For the Pros. Of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Aug. 2, 2001) (referring to “conscious and
voluntary participation”).
238
See Schabas, supra note 25, at 1525.
239
Prosecutor v. Todorović, Todorović, supra note 143, ¶ 57.
240
Prosecutor v. Kunarać, IT-96-23-T, Judgment, ¶ 357 (Feb. 22, 2001); Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, IT-9832-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 171, 278. (Nov. 29, 2002).
241
Vasiljević, supra note 235, at ¶¶ 173.
242
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 793 (Int’l Trib. For the Pros. Of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991
Mar. 3, 2000).
243
Prosecutor v. Erdemović, IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, (Mar. 5, 1998); Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT95-9/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶¶ 55–57 (July 31, 2001).
244
Schabas, supra note 25, at 1525; see Prosecutor v. Kambanda, ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment, ¶ 61 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. For Rwanda Sept. 4, 1998); Prosecutor v. Delalić, IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 1261 (Int’l Trib. For the
Pros. Of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Nov. 16, 1998); Serushago, supra note 236, at ¶ 30; Blaškić, supra note 242, at
¶ 793; Krstić, supra note 237, at ¶ 711.
245
Delalić, supra note 244, ¶¶ 777, 780; Momir Nikolić, supra note 235, ¶ 125; Dragan Nikolić, supra
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is on the Prosecutor, while the burden of proof in respect of mitigating
circumstances is on the Defense.246 It is also important to note that the ad hoc
tribunals require that aggravating circumstances be proven beyond reasonable
doubt,247 while mitigating circumstances require no more than proof on a
balance of probabilities.248 In Prosecutor v. Češić, the Sentencing Tribunal could
not conclude on a balance of probabilities that the accused was of a good
character,249 and therefore did not give him the credit due to a convicted person
of good character. The Sentencing Tribunal seemingly based its decision on the
typical Anglo-American legal arrangement which places the burden of proof in
respect of mitigating circumstances on the accused.250 One might well wonder
how the burden of proof with regard to mitigating circumstances will play itself

note 235, ¶¶ 125, 141, 145; Deronjić, supra note 235, ¶ 155; Stakić, supra note 235, ¶ 416; Prosecutor v.
Hadžihasanović & Kubura, IT-01-47-A, Judgment, ¶ 325 (Int’l Trib. For the Pros. Of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Apr.
22, 2008); Bizimungu v. The Prosecutor, ICTR-00-56B-A, Judgment, ¶ 400 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For Rwanda June
30, 2014); Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, IT-05-88/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 644 (Int’l Trib. For the Pros. Of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia
since 1991 Apr. 8, 2015); Bemba Gombo, supra note 9, ¶19.
246
Kunarać, supra note 235, ¶ 847; Stakić, supra note 235, ¶ 406.
247
Delalić, supra note 244, ¶ 763; Kunarać, supra note 235, ¶ 847; Prosecutor v. Sikirica, IT-95-8-S,
Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 110 (Int’l Trib. For the Pros. Of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Nov. 13, 2001); Momir Nikolić,
supra note 235, ¶ 126; Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, IT-02-60/1-A, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, ¶ 145
(Int’l Trib. For the Pros. Of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed
in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Mar. 8, 2006); Češić, supra note 235, ¶ 47; Deronjić, supra
note 235, ¶ 155; Blaškić, supra note 242, ¶¶ 686, 697; Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgment,
¶ 294 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For Rwanda May 23, 2005); Prosecutor v. Babić, IT-03-72-A, Judgment, ¶ 43 (Int’l Trib.
For the Pros. Of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991 July 18, 2005); Prosecutor v. Nahimana, ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment,
¶ 1038 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For Rwanda Nov. 28, 2007); Prosecutor v. Renzaho, ICTR-97-31-T, Sentencing
Judgment, ¶ 822 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For Rwanda July 14, 2009); Gatete, supra note 235, ¶ 677; Lubanga, supra
note 235, ¶ 33.
248
Delalić, supra note 244, ¶ 590; Kunarać, supra note 235, ¶ 847; Sikirica, supra note 247, ¶ 110;
Prosecutor v. Simić, IT-95-9-A, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 40 (Int’l Trib. For the Pros. Of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Nov.
28, 2006); Stakić, supra note 235, at ¶ 920; Momir Nikolić, supra note 235, ¶ 126; Dragan Nikolić, supra note
247, ¶ 145; Deronjić, supra note 235; Blaškić, supra note 242, ¶ 697; Kajelijeli, supra note 247, ¶ 294; Babić,
supra note 247, at ¶ 43; Prosecutor v. Miroslav Bralo, IT-95-17-A, Judgment, ¶ 8 (Int’l Trib. For the Pros. Of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former
Yugoslavia since 1991 Apr. 2, 2007); Prosecutor v. Dragan Zelenović, IT-96-23/2-A, Sentencing Judgment,
¶ 11 (Int’l Trib. For the Pros. Of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Oct. 31, 2007); Prosecutor v. Nahimana, ICTR99-52-T, Judgment, ¶ 1038 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For Rwanda Dec. 3, 2003); Hadžihasanović & Kubura, supra note
245, ¶ 302; Gatete, supra note 235, ¶ 677; Lubanga, supra note 235, ¶ 33.
249
Češić, supra note 235, ¶ 87.
250
See Kajelijeli, supra note 247, ¶ 294 (noting that the burden of proof with the regard to mitigating
circumstances is on the accused).
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out in jurisprudence of the ICC, given the express provision in the ICC Statute
that a person standing trial in the ICC will under no circumstances “have
imposed on him or her any reversal of the burden of proof or any onus of
rebuttal.”251 It is submitted that this provision applies only to material elements
of a crime, and since mitigating factors are not elements of the crime as such,
the ICC will most likely follow the approach of the ad hoc Tribunals and require
an accused to prove mitigating factors relied upon on a balance of probabilities.
It is also worth noting that the weight to be attached to mitigating
circumstances is discretionary;252 and that absence on mitigating circumstances
can never serve as an aggravating circumstance.253
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence mention the following circumstances
that must be taken into account for purposes of punishment and which in essence
fall under the present heading as defined for purposes of this survey:
In general, the age, education, social and economic conditions of the
convicted person;254
As an aggravating circumstance, prior convictions for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the ICC or of a similar nature;255 and
As a mitigating circumstance, the convicted person’s conduct after the act,
including his or her efforts to compensate victims and any cooperation with the
Court.256
A. Circumstances Existing at the Time the Offence was Committed
The following extenuating or aggravating circumstances may be singled out
as ones that existed at the time the offence was committed.
1. Individual Circumstances of the Accused
According to Faiza King & Anne-Marie La Rosa, personal circumstances
should mainly be confined to factors that enable the perpetrator to commit the
particular crime, such as his or her position in the military or civilian
251

Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 67(1)(i).
Prosecutor v. Naletilic, IT-98-34-T, Judgment, ¶ 742 (Mar. 31, 2003); Stakić, supra note 235, ¶ 405.
253
Blaškić, supra note 242, ¶ 687; Prosecutor v. Plavšić, IT-00-39&40/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 64
(Feb. 27, 2003).
254
RPE, supra note 86, Rule 145(1)(c).
255
Id. Rule 145(2)(b)(i).
256
Id. Rule 145(2)(a)(ii).
252
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hierarchy.257 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence go well beyond these
confines and explicitly mention the age, education, and social and economic
conditions of the convicted person, which, it would seem, can serve as either
mitigating or aggravating circumstances.258
One is not concerned with personal attributes of the Accused that may be
indicative of reduced culpability. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence, quite
rightly, deal separately with “the degree of intent”259 and “diminished mental
capacity”,260 which constitute, within the meaning of this survey, sentencing
factors of the offence.
Individual (subjective) circumstances of the accused—such as age,
background, education, intelligence, and mental structure—received special
prominence in the sentencing directives of the ICTR in the case of Kambanda.261
In Prosecutor v. Furundžiya, the young age of the accused (twenty-three years
at the time the offence was committed) was taken into account as a mitigating
circumstance.262 In Prosecutor v. Serushago, the ICTR accepted as a mitigating
factor the fact that the convicted person was the father of six children, two of
whom were still very young.263 In Prosecutor v. Vinvent Rutaganira, the Trial
Chamber held the old age of the accused (sixty years) and the state of his health
(he suffered from diabetes and was in poor health) are factors to be taken into
account by the Chamber in determining the sentence.264 In Prosecutor v. Biljana
Plavšić, the fact that until the time of the offence the accused was known to have

257

King & La Rosa, supra note 8, at 322–23, 332.
RPE, supra note 86, Rule 145(1)(c).
259
Id.
260
Id. Rule 145(2)(a)(i).
261
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment, ¶¶ 28–29 (Sept. 4, 1998); see also Prosecutor v.
Krstić (A), IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 267 (Aug. 2, 2001).
262
Prosecutor v. Furundžiya, IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 284, 291 (Dec. 10, 1998); see also Erdemović,
supra note 243, ¶ 16(i) (where the convicted person was twenty-three years old at the time the crime was
committed); Delalić, supra note 244, at ¶ 1283 (where the convicted person was nineteen years old at the time
the crime was committed); Serushago, supra note 236, ¶ 39 (where the convicted person was thirty-seven years
old at the time the crime was committed); Prosecutor v. Serugendo, ICTR-2005-84-I, Judgment, ¶ 91 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. For Rwanda June 12, 2006).
263
Serushago, supra note 236, ¶ 39; see also Erdemović, supra note 243 (referring to the convicted
person’s “current family status”); Furundžiya, supra note 262, ¶ 280 (noting, though, ¶ 284, that this factor must
not be given “significant weight”); Banović, supra note 235, ¶ 82 (taking into account that the accused is married
and has a child); Obrenović, supra note 235, ¶ 139 (noting that the accused was married to an economist and is
the father of a six-year old boy); Prosecutor v. Rutaganira, ICTR-95-1C-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 120–21 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. For Rwanda Mar. 14, 2005) (noting that being the father of nine children and having a wife who has become
deputy mayor in charge of women’s development in her commune, “augurs well for the potential rehabilitation
of the Accused into a local community and his joining the national reconciliation process”).
264
Rutaganira, supra note 263, at ¶¶ 132–36.
258
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“led an honest, honourable and private family, professional and social life was
taken into account in mitigation of sentence.”265
In Prosecutor v. Goran Jelesić, the Tribunal decided that “Judges cannot
accord too great a weight” to personal attributes of the convicted person, such
as age (he was twenty-three years old when the crime was committed), no
previous convictions for any violent crime, and being the father of a young
child.266 On appeal, focusing only on the element of age, the Appeals Chamber
recognized that age is an element that should be considered for sentencing
purposes,267 but since all that is required was for the Trial Chamber to consider
the age of the accused, which it did,268 the appeal on this ground was dismissed.
Emphasis in jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR on age as a mitigating
factor has been criticized by one analyst, denouncing for example the verdict in
Furundžiya, referred to above,269 as “a strange decision, as clearly at the age of
23, the accused is old enough to be aware that his offences were unlawful,”270
or noting that in Kayishema & Ruzindana, where Rizindana was thirty-two years
old,271 the ICTR “gave a rediculously wide interpretation to the term youth.”272
The same analyst, on the other hand, applauded a prison sentence of fifteen years
(instead of five as requested by the Defence) in the case of Esad Landžo (an
Accused in the Case who was nineteen years old at the relevant time)
praiseworthy, since it “prevented the Accused from exploiting the excuse of age
as a way of avoiding full accountability for his crime.”273 This line of reasoning
is misleading, since the age of an accused was but one of several sentencing

265

Plavšić, supra note 253, at ¶ 108.
Prosecutor v. Jelisić, IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 124 (Dec. 14, 1999); see also Furundžiya, supra note
262, at ¶ 284 (saying the same in regard to absence of previous convictions and the family disposition of the
convicted person); Obrenović, supra note 235, at ¶ 140 (noting that in view of the gravity of the crime, the family
circumstances of the accused cannot be afforded any significant eight); Momir Nikolić, supra note 235, at ¶ 169–
170 (deciding that family circumstances, such as the accused being a teacher, was married and had two sons can
be said of many accused persons and should not be given any significant weight); Gatete, supra note 235, at
¶ 681 (proclaiming that, given the gravity of the crimes committed, the Trial Chamber can only accord “very
limited weight” to the lengthy public service, family situation and health condition of the accused).
267
Jelisić, supra note 6, ¶¶ 129, 131; see also Erdemović, supra note 243, ¶ 16; Furundžiya, supra note
262, ¶ 284; Blaškić, supra note 242, ¶ 778; Kunarać, supra note 235, ¶ 864; Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez,
supra note 54, ¶ 853; Banović, supra note 235, ¶ 75; Dragan Nikolić, supra note 235, ¶ 146; Deronjić, supra
note 235, ¶ 124.
268
Jelisić, supra note 6, ¶ 131.
269
Supra note 262 and accompanying text.
270
Olaoluwa Olusanya, Granting Immunity to Child Combatants Supranationally, in SENTENCING AND
SANCTIONING IN SUPRANATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 87, 106 (Roelof Haveman & Olaoluwa Olusanya eds., 2006).
271
Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 12 (May 21, 1999).
272
Olusanya, supra note 271, at 107.
273
Id. at 105.
266
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factors taken into account by the sentencing tribunals. In cases where the
Accused was young but not so young (say in his thirties), age was considered
for sentencing purposes, not as a mitigating circumstance in itself, but with a
view to the chances of rehabilitation of the convicted person.274 In Prosecutor v.
Češić, the Sentencing Tribunal declined to accept the age of twenty-seven years
as a mitigating factor since the accused was “well beyond the age of majority.”275
In Prosecutor v. Plavišić, the question whether being a senior (seventy-two years
old) should serve as a mitigating factor was considered. The Tribunal stated that
there was no authority in ICTY jurisprudence as to the effect of an advanced age
on sentencing,276 but decided that an advanced age is a sentencing factor for two
reasons: (a) physical deterioration that comes with age; and (b) the fact that the
convicted person may have little worth-while time left to live for upon her
release.277 The advanced age of the convicted person was therefore accepted by
the Sentencing Tribunal as a mitigating factor.278 Sensitivity of the ad hoc
Tribunals to age for sentencing purposes must indeed be applauded, since tender
age and being not so young are in themselves mitigating factors.
Other personal circumstances that have featured in judgments of the ad hoc
Tribunals’ sentencing directives are a poor family background,279 physical and
mental condition,280 poor health,281 indigence,282 a mediocre level of
education,283 an immature and fragile personality,284 a corrigible personality
favorable to rehabilitation,285 not being a danger to society,286 the work record
274
See Kayishema & Ruzindana, supra note 25, at ¶ 12 (noting that for sentencing purposes it considered
“the relatively young age of Ruzindana (thirty-two years old in 1994) and the possibility of rehabilitation”);
Blaškić, supra note 235, ¶ 778 (noting that “[t]he case-law of the two ad hoc Tribunals on rehabilitation takes
the young age of the accused into account as a mitigating circumstance”).
275
Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 91.
276
Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶ 103; Krnojelać, supra note 235, ¶ 533. In Prosecutor v. Krnojelać, the
Sentencing Tribunal did mention the accused’s age as a “final matter to which the Trial Chamber has had regard
in sentencing.”
277
Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶ 105.
278
Id. at ¶ 106.
279
Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1283; see also Erdemović (Second Sentencing Judgment), supra note 25,
¶ 16(i); Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 36; Serushago, supra note 208, ¶ 24; Serugendo, supra note 147, ¶ 91
(simply mentioning the family position of the convicted person).
280
Erdemović (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 11, ¶ 44; see also Todorović (Sentencing Judgment),
supra note 10, ¶ 93–95 (dealing with the diminished mental capacity of the convicted person).
281
Rutaganda, supra note 61, ¶ 50, 472; Serugendo, supra note 147, ¶ 92, 94; Rutaganira, supra note 13,
¶ 133, 135-36.
282
Tadić (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 96, ¶ 62.
283
Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶ 61.
284
Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1283; see also Erdemović (Second Sentencing Judgment), supra note 25,
¶ 16(i) under family background; Jelisić (T), supra note 80, ¶ 125 (mentioning personality disorders).
285
Erdemović (, supra note 11, ¶ 111.
286
Id.
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of the convicted person,287 being non-nationalistic (that is, to one’s credit, not
entertaining sectional biases in a highly polarized plural society),288 and finally,
having to serve a prison sentence far from home.289
Emphasis has also been placed, in extenuation, on the general nicety of a
convicted person, for example: being “an honest and respectable citizen;”290 or
being inspired by a sense of justice; being an idealist, being immature and
impulsive, having worked in the local branch of the Red Cross; assisting
foreigners, the underprivileged and illiterate persons in the region; and rendering
assistance to young students.291 Having “an honest character” and being “an
easygoing young man showing no signs of bigotry or intolerance, with a desire
to help others in difficulty,” was also considered in mitigation of sentence.292
While a good character was mentioned as an extenuating circumstance in several
judgments of the ad hoc Tribunals,293 in most cases little weight was given to
the character of a convicted person for purposes of sentencing.294
2. Prior Convictions
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence mention, as an aggravating
circumstance, “[a]ny relevant prior criminal convictions for crimes under the
jurisdiction of the Court or of a similar nature.”295 Although not mentioned in
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, it stands to reason that the absence of any
prior convictions for such crimes should be taken into account in mitigation of
the sentence. That, in any event, appears from several judgments of the ad hoc
Tribunals.296
287

Tadić (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 96, ¶ 63.
Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶ 105–08; see also Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 280.
289
Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶ 111.
290
Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶ 59; see also Serugendo, supra note 147, ¶ 91.
291
Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶ 61–62.
292
Erdemović (Second Sentencing Judgment), supra note 25, ¶ 16(i) (under Character). As to the
commendable character of a convicted person as a mitigating factor, see also Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 478;
Nikolić, supra note 80, ¶ 164.
293
Aleksovski, supra note 9, ¶ 236; Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 779–82; Kupreškić, supra note 9, ¶ 459;
Krnojelać, supra note 14, ¶ 519; Ntakirutimana, supra note 90, ¶ 895, 906; Momir Nikolić, supra note 80, ¶ 164;
Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 134; Semanza, supra note 147, ¶ 397; Sylvestre Gacumbitsi v. The Prosecutor, Case
No ICTR-2001-64-A, ¶ 195 (July 7, 2006).
294
Kunarać, supra note 153, ¶ 33; Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 782; Ntakirutimana, supra note 90, ¶ 908;
Stakić, supra note 9, ¶ 926; Niyitegeka, supra note 129, ¶ 264–66: Semanza, supra note 147, ¶ 398; Seromba,
supra note 186, ¶ 235.
295
RPE, supra note 86, Rule 145(2)(b)(i).
296
Tadić (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 96, ¶ 63; Erdemović (Second Sentencing Judgment), supra
note 25, ¶ 16(i), under the heading, Character; Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 45; Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 280,
284; Aleksovski, supra note 11, ¶ 236; Jelisić (T), supra note 80, ¶ 124; Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 780; Banović,
288
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In Prosecutor v. Kordić, the Trial Chamber noted, on the other hand, that “it
will be rare” for personal circumstances, such as character, no previous
convictions, poor health, and youth, to play “a significant part” in mitigation of
a sentence.297 In Prosecutor v. Furundžiya, the Trial Chamber decided that the
fact that the accused had no previous convictions and was the father of a young
child “[could not] be given significant weight in a case of [that] gravity.”298
B. Conduct of the Convicted Person after the Event
As far as the convicted person’s conduct after the criminal act is concerned,
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence mention two examples, namely “efforts by
the person to compensate the victims” and “any co-operation with the Court.”299
Judgments of the ad hoc Tribunals more generously laid special stress on cooperation by the accused with the Prosecutor, a guilty plea, regret and remorse.
1. Co-operation with the Court
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC mention, as a mitigating
circumstance, “co-operation with the Court,”300 while the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence of the ICTY and of the ICTR expressly provide that “substantial
co-operation with the Prosecutor by the convicted person” is to be taken into
account as an mitigating circumstance.301 Co-operation with the Prosecutor
must, thus in terms of the latter set of Rules, be “substantial.”302 Substantiality
of co-operation will depend in part on “the extent and quality of the information
provided to the Prosecution.”303 In Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljević, a Trial

supra note 6, ¶¶ 62, 76; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 156; Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶ 59; Rutaganira, supra note 13,
¶ 130; Serugendo, supra note 147, ¶ 91.
297
Kordić, supra note 54, ¶ 848.
298
Furundžiya, supra note 25, ¶ 284; see also Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 76.
299
RPE, supra note 86, Rule 145(2)(a)(ii).
300
Id.
301
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal, Rule 101(B)(ii), U.N. Doc.
IT/32/Rev.13, reprinted in International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991,
Basic Documents 29, at 130 (1998) [hereinafter ICTY RPE]; Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda, Rule 101(B)(ii), U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.2 (July 5, 1996), reprinted in Virginia
Morris & Michael Scharf, 2 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 19, at 55 (1999) [hereafter ICTR
RPE]; see also Vasiljević, supra note 80, ¶ 180 (emphasizing that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
ad hoc Tribunals only mention co-operation with the Prosecutor and do not cover other forms of co-operation).
302
Vasiljević, supra note 80, ¶ 179.
303
Todorović (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 10, ¶ 86; see also Sikirica, supra note 80, ¶ 111; Plavšić,
supra note 61, ¶ 63; Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 58; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 62; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 244.
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Chamber of the ICTY found that cooperation with the Prosecutor was only
“modest” but did deserve some, albeit very little, weight.304
In several of their judgments, the ICTY305 and the ICTR306 looked favorably
upon substantial co-operation with the Prosecutor. Voluntary surrender was
specially mentioned, to the convicted person’s credit, in Prosecutor v.
Serushago.307 In Prosecutor v. Obrenović, the Sentencing Tribunal attached
“little weight” to an offer by the Accused to surrender when he was arrested,
because it was not clear whether he would have surrendered voluntary if his
arrest was not imminent.308
In Prosecutor v. Blaškić, the Trial Chamber laid down the conditions under
which co-operation with the Prosecutor will qualify as mitigating factors:
The earnestness and degree of co-operation with the Prosecutor
decides whether there is reason to reduce the sentence on this ground.
Therefore, the evaluation of the accused’s co-operation depends on the
information he provides. Moreover, the Trial Chamber singles out for
mention the spontaneity and selflessness of the co-operation which
must be lent without asking for something in return. Provided that the
co-operation lent respects the aforesaid requirements, the Trial
Chamber classes such co-operation as a “significant mitigating
factor[.]”309

In Prosecutor v. Deronjević, the Sentencing Tribunal decided, on basis of a
guilty plea and substantial co-operation, that “a substantial reduction of the
sentence deserved for the crime is warranted.”310
Expecting nothing in return would mean that a plea agreement cannot be
accepted as co-operation.311 In the Čelebići Case, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY
304

Vasiljević, supra note 137, ¶ 299; endorsed on appeal in Vasiljević, supra note 80, ¶ 180.
Erdemović (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 11, ¶¶ 99–101; Erdemović (Second Sentencing
Judgment), supra note 25, ¶ 16(i), under the heading, Character, ¶ iv, 21; Todorović (Sentencing Judgment),
supra note 10, ¶¶ 83–88; Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶ 109; Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶¶ 122, 129, 141; Deronjić,
supra note 9, ¶ 156; Serugendo, supra note 147, ¶ 91.
306
Kayishema, supra note 25, at Sentence ¶ 20; Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 29, 36, 47, 61(i); Serushago,
supra note 33, ¶¶ 31–33, 38, 41; Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶¶ 56‒58; Musema, supra note 107, ¶ 1007; Serushago,
supra note 208, ¶ 24.
307
Serushago, supra note 33, ¶¶ 34, 41; see also Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶ 55; Kayishema, supra note
25, ¶ 20; Kupreškić, supra note 9, ¶¶ 853, 860, 863; Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 776; Kunarać, supra note 5, ¶ 868;
Serushago, supra note 208, ¶ 24; Kupreškić, supra note 9, ¶ 430; Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶¶ 65, 84, 110;
Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶¶ 136, 141; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶¶ 156, 266; Rutaganda, supra note 61, ¶ 145.
308
Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 111; see also Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 267.
309
Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 774.
310
Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 276.
311
Contra Schabas, supra note 73, at 497 (stating that if an admission of guilt is to be a mitigating factor,
305
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altogether rules out an attempt at plea bargaining as a mitigating factor.312 In the
case of Duško Tadić, the Trial Chamber found that although there was “some
degree of co-operation” by the accused with the Prosecutor, it did not live up to
the standard of “substantial co-operation” and should therefore not be taken into
account for sentencing purposes.313 Although substantial co-operation with the
prosecutor serves as a mitigating factor, failure of an accused to co-operate is
not necessarily an aggravating factor,314 because an accused has the right to be
presumed innocent and can reap the benefit of the fact that the burden of proof
rest squarely on the shoulders of the prosecution.
2. Admission of Guilt
An admission of guilt is not expressly mentioned in the ICC’s Rules of
Procedure and Evidence as a mitigating factor, probably because of differences
of opinion between proponents of the adversarial and the inquisitorial
procedures as to the significance of such a plea.315 It could, of course, come
within the general confines of co-operation with the Court,316 but has been
mentioned in judgments of the ad hoc Tribunals as an extenuating circumstance
alongside co-operation with the Court.317
In Erdemović, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY had this to say about an
admission of guilt:
An admission of guilt demonstrates honesty and it is important for the
International Tribunal to encourage people to come forth, whether
already indicted or as unknown perpetrators. Furthermore, this
voluntary admission of guilt which has saved the International

it would encourage plea bargaining).
312
Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1280.
313
Tadić (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 8, ¶ 19; see also Tadić (Sentencing Judgment), supra note
96, ¶ 58 (noting that the convicted person did not co-operate and denied his guilt).
314
Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶ 64; Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 61; Prosecutor v. Bisengimana, Case No. ICTR00-60-T, Judge and Sentence ¶ 127 (Apr. 13, 2006); Gatete, supra note 78, ¶ 680.
315
France and Rwanda were among those who believed that an admission of guilt should not be taken into
account for sentencing purposes. See Schabas, supra note 25, at 1526 note 193.
316
See Peglau, supra note 2, at 148.
317
Serushago, supra note 208, ¶ 24; see also Erdemović (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 11, ¶ 55;
Erdemović (Second Sentencing Judgment), supra note 25, ¶ 16(ii); Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶¶ 36, 50, 52,
61(iii); Serushago, supra note 33, ¶¶ 35, 41; Kayishema, supra note 25, at Sentence ¶ 20; Ruggiu, supra note
28, ¶ 53–55; Jelisić (A), supra note 80, ¶ 122; Todorović (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 10, ¶ 76; Sikirica,
supra note 80, ¶¶ 148–51, 192–93, 228; Kupreškić, supra note 9, ¶ 464; Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶¶ 65, 66–81,
110; Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 62, 68; Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶¶ 111–18, 141; Nikolić, supra note 35, ¶¶ 146,
232–37; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 60; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 156; Serugendo, supra note 147, ¶¶ 89, 91.
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Tribunal the time and effort of a lengthy investigation and trial is to be
commended.318

In Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, the Sentencing Tribunal cautioned against
affording “undue consideration or importance to the role of a guilty plea to
saving of resources.”319 The Tribunal referred to a strongly worded dissenting
opinion of Judge David Hunt, in the case against Slobodan Milošević, relating
to the admissibility of evidence in the form of written statements, which was
seemingly resorted to by the ICTY to comply with the Completion Strategy
imposed upon the ad hoc Tribunals by the Security Council.320 According to
Judge Hunt, the ICTY “will not be judged by the number of convictions which
it enters, or by the speed with which it concludes the Completion Strategy which
the Security Council has endorsed, but by the fairness of its trials.”321 In Momir
Nikolic, the Sentencing Tribunal stated along much the same lines that “savings
of time and resources may be a result of guilty pleas,” but “should not be the
main reason for promoting guilty pleas through plea agreements.”322 An
appropriate sentence must primarily be based on the gravity of the offence and
not on a guilty plea.323
In Todorović, the Trial Chamber added to the benefits of an admission of
guilt mentioned in Erdemović the fact that it “relieves victims and witnesses of
the necessity of giving evidence with the attendant stress which this may
incur,”324 but also noted that to derive all the benefits concerned that would
prompt a lighter sentence, the admission of guilt must be entered before
commencement of the trial and in any event not at a late stage of the
318
Erdemović (Second Sentencing Judgment), supra note 25, ¶ 16(i) (under Character); see also
Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah,
¶ 2; Todorović (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 10, ¶ 80; Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶ 73; Banović, supra note 6,
¶¶ 66, 68; Nikolić, supra note 80, ¶ 151; Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 118; Dragan Nikolić, supra note 35, ¶¶ 121,
231; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 234 see also id., ¶ 134 (the Sentencing Tribunal noting that “[a]s a side effect,
albeit not a significant mitigating factor, it [a guilty plea] also saves the Tribunal’s resources”); Češić, supra
note 9, ¶ 56, 59.
319
Nikolić, supra note 80, ¶ 67.
320
See S.C. Res. 1503 (2003) of Aug. 28, 2003, calling on the ad hoc Tribunals to take all possible
measures to complete all trial activities at front instance by the end of 2008.
321
Prosecutior v. Slobodan Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.4, Dissenting Opinion of Judge David
Hunt on Admissibility of Evidence in Chief in the Form of Written Statements, ¶ 22 (Oct. 21, 2003); see also
Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR-98-42-A15bis, ¶ 17 (Sep. 24, 2003).
322
Momir Nikolić, supra note 80, ¶ 67.
323
Id., ¶ 69.
324
Todorović, supra note 10, ¶ 80. See also id., ¶ 92 (accepting remorse, a guilty plea and co-operation
with the Prosecutor as mitigating factors); Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 66; Nikolić, supra note 80, ¶ 150; Obrenović,
supra note 9, ¶ 117; Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶¶ 121, 231; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 134 (noting that “[a] guilty
plea protects victims from having to relive their experiences and re-open old wounds”); Češić, supra note 9,
¶¶ 56, 58.
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proceedings.325 The importance of the timing of a guilty plea was also
emphasized in Prosecutor v. Sikirica.326 In Prosecutor v. Milan Simić, the
Sentencing Tribunal afforded “some credit” to a guilty plea despite its
lateness.327 In the Delalić Case, the Trial Chamber refused to accept a “belated
partial admission of guilt” as a mitigating factor.328 In the Case of Duško Tadić,
the Trial Chamber took a grim view of the fact that the accused falsely asserted
an alibi and denied his guilt.329
In Kambanda, the Trial Chamber reiterated that an admission of guilt
demonstrates honesty,330 and added that a guilty plea “is likely to encourage
other individuals to recognize their responsibilities during the tragic events
which occurred in Rwanda in 1994.”331 The Tribunal did note that a guilty plea
does not necessarily mean remorse.332 Other deserving attributes of a guilty plea
are its contribution to establishing the truth,333 its potential of promoting
reconciliation within a strife-torn community,334 and its being an important step
toward rehabilitation of the accused and his or her re-integration in society.335
It is one thing to say that an admission of guilt should count as a mitigating
factor; it is quite another to hold a plea of not guilty as an aggravating factor.
There is also a difference between persistently denying one’s guilt and entering
a plea of not guilty. Pleading not guilty and leaving it up to the Prosecutor to
prove one’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt is a recognized right of every person
confronting criminal charges, and that right is founded on the presumption of
innocence which in turn is a salient principle of criminal justice.336 Aggravation
325
Todorović, supra note 10, ¶ 81. See also Momir Nikolić, supra note 80, ¶ 148; Češić, supra note 9,
¶ 56; Rutaganira, supra note 13, ¶ 151–52.
326
Sikirica, supra note 80, ¶ 150. See also Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 231; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 234.
327
Simić, supra note 153, ¶ 87. See also Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 231.
328
Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1279. See also Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 777 (noting that an admission of guilt
is an extenuating factor but that it did not apply in that case because the accused did not plead guilty).
329
Tadić (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 96, ¶ 58; Kayishema & Ruzindana, supra note 25, at Sentence
¶ 16.
330
Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 53. See also Erdemović (Second Sentencing Judgement), supra note 25,
¶ 16(ii); Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 66.
331
Kambanda, supra note 9 ¶ 61(ii). See also Erdemović(Second Sentencing Judgement), supra note 25,
¶ 16(ii); Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 231; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 234.
332
Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶ 52.
333
Sikirica, supra note 80, ¶ 149; Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶ 73, 80; Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 66; Nikolić,
supra note 80, ¶149; Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 116; Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶¶ 231, 233, 237; Češić, supra note
9, ¶¶ 28, 58; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶¶ 234, 236.
334
Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶¶ 70, 79, 80; Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 66; Nikolić, supra note 80, ¶¶ 72, 145,
149; Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶¶ 111, 116; Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶¶ 121, 231; Češić, supra note 9, ¶¶ 28, 58;
Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶¶ 234, 236.
335
Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 28.
336
Nikolić, supra note 80, ¶148; Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 113.
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of sentence should not merely be based on a plea of not guilty. However, an
accused who gives false evidence and by word and conduct dishonestly persist
in his or her innocence exceeds the accepted confines of the presumption of
innocence, and that conduct can and should be taken into account for sentencing
purposes.
3. Regret and Remorse
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC refer in quite general terms
to conduct of the convicted person after the criminal act, adding only one
example indicative of regret and remorse: “efforts by the person to compensate
victims.”337
Co-operation with the prosecution, a guilty plea, and evidence of remorse as
grounds of extenuation338 have had a mixed reception in the ad hoc Tribunals.
Regret and remorse, or regret and repentance, was accepted in Ruggiu as a
mitigating factor,339 and having been expressed in public was favorably looked
upon by the sentencing Tribunal in Prosecutor v. Serushago.340 In Prosecutor v.
Obrenović, the Sentencing Tribunal accepted genuine remorse as “a substantial
mitigating factor.”341 In Prosecutor v. Plavšić, the expression of remorse
connected with a guilty plea was considered a mitigating factor.342 In Prosecutor
v. Kupreskić, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY decided that “limited
acceptance of guilt” ought to be given “some consideration in terms of
sentence.”343 However, remorse was treated in Kambanda with a great deal of
skepticism.344 The Trial Chamber noted in that case that “remorse is not the only
reasonable inference that can be drawn from a guilty plea.”345 It must above all
337

RPE, supra note 86, Rule 145(2)(a)(ii).
See generally Kayishema & Ruzindana, supra note 25, ¶ 20; Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶¶ 53–55;
Todorović, supra note 10, ¶ 92.
339
Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶¶ 56–58, 69–72. See also Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶¶ 44, 45; Erdemović
(Second Sentencing Judgment), supra note 25, ¶ 16(iii) (under the heading, Remorse); Kambanda, supra note 9,
¶ 34, 52; Serushago, supra note 33, ¶¶ 40–41; Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 775; Delalić, supra note 34, ¶ 1277;
Serushago v. Prosecutor, supra note 208, ¶ 24; Todorović, supra note 10, ¶ 89-92; Sikirica, supra note 80, ¶ 148;
Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶¶ 65, 70; Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 62; Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶¶ 121, 141; Nikolić,
supra note 34, ¶¶ 231, 237, 241–42; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶¶ 156, 234; Serugendo, supra note 147, ¶ 91.
340
Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 40.
341
Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 121.
342
Plavšić, supra note 61, ¶ 73.
343
Kupreškić, supra note 293, ¶ 464. See also Nikolić, supra note 34, ¶ 146; Prosecutor v. Deronjić, supra
note 9, ¶ 156.
344
Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶¶ 51–52.
345
Id., ¶ 52; see id., ¶ 61. See also Jelisić (T), supra note 80, ¶ 127 (the Tribunal only affording “relative
weight” to the accused’s admission of guilt, because he did not show any remorse before the guilty plea), aff’d
by Jelisić, supra note 80 (A), ¶¶ 119-23; Nikolić, supra note 80, ¶ 161 (the Sentencing Tribunal accepting the
338
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be demonstrated that the expression of remorse is sincere.346 It is possible, of
course, that an accused can express sincere regrets without admitting his or her
participation in the crime.347
In the Čelebići Case, the accused after his conviction submitted to the
Tribunal a written statement expressing his regrets. The tribunal would have
nothing of it, stating that “[s]uch expression of remorse would have been more
appropriately made in open court, with these victims and witnesses present, and
thus this ostensible, belated contrition seems to merely have been an attempt to
seek concession in the matter of sentencing.”348
Participating in acts of mercy and assistance to victims will almost invariably
be perceived by a sentencing Tribunal as concrete evidence of regret and
remorse, or perhaps of reluctant participation under pressure in the criminal act
and will either way serve in mitigation of sentence.349
A persistent defiant attitude will, on the other hand, demonstrate absence of
regret and remorse and will do the accused no good when upon conviction the
sentence to be imposed becomes an issue. In the Čelebići Case, for example, the
Trial Chamber noted: “[t]he accused has consistently demonstrated a defiant
attitude and a lack of respect for the judicial process and for the participants in
the trial, almost verging on lack of awareness of the gravity of the offences for
which he is charged and the solemnity of the judicial process.”350
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This is not the time and place to record and to evaluate the American
sentencing practices. However, there are some lessons in the above analysis for
expression of remorse as a mitigating factor but in view of the circumstances of the case declining to afford
“substantial weight to this factor.”).
346
Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶¶ 96–98; Erdemović, supra note 25, ¶ 16; Jelisić (T), supra note 80, ¶ 127;
Blaškić, supra note 1, ¶ 775; Todorović, supra note 10, ¶ 89; Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 41; Ruggiu, supra
note 28, ¶¶ 69–72; Sikirica, supra note 80, ¶¶ 152, 194, 230; Simić (Sentencing Judgment), supra note 153, ¶ 92;
Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 72; Vasiljević, supra note 80, ¶ 177; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 66; Deronjić, supra note 9,
¶ 156; Rutaganira, supra note 13, ¶ 158.
347
Vasiljević, supra note 80, ¶ 177.
348
Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1279.
349
Erdemović, supra note 11, ¶ 111; Erdemović (Second Sentencing Judgement), supra note 25, ¶ 16(iii),
17; Kambanda, supra note 9, ¶¶ 34, 50–52; Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1270; Serushago, supra note 33, ¶ 38, 40;
Kayishema & Ruzindana, supra note 25, ¶ 20; Rutaganda, supra note 61, ¶ 471; Ruggiu, supra note 28, ¶¶ 73–
74; Delalić, supra note 34, ¶ 775-76; Serushago v. Prosecutor, supra note 208, ¶ 24; Sikirica, supra note 80,
¶ 242; Krnojelać, supra note 14, ¶ 518; Banović, supra note 6, ¶ 83; Obrenović, supra note 9, ¶ 134; Nikolić,
supra note 34, ¶ 146; Češić, supra note 9, ¶ 78; Deronjić, supra note 9, ¶ 156; Rutaganira, supra note 13, ¶ 155.
350
Delalić, supra note 7, ¶ 1244. See also id., ¶¶ 1217, 1251.
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American penologists. It is worth noting, in conclusion, that the sentencing
practices of the United States are not even remotely in conformity with what has
come to be accepted as international directives of sentencing standards.
In the United States, almost exclusive emphasis is placed, for sentencing
purposes, on the gravity of the crime.351 In Solem v. Helms, it was decided that
proportionality of a punishment to the offence is determined with three criteria
in mind: “(i) the gravity of the offence and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the
sentences imposed on other criminals [for offences of the same gravity] in the
same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for the same crime in other
jurisdictions.”352 The essence of the penal policy in Solem was subsequently
overruled in Harmelin v. Michigan, where Justice Scalia decided that “the
Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee”;353 that taking into
account mitigating factors for sentencing purposes “has no support in the text
and history of the Eighth Amendment”;354 and that “[s]evere, mandatory
penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional sense,
having been employed in various forms throughout our Nation’s history.”355
Individualization of sentencing to fit the crime, the criminal, and the interests of
society, which have become the international standard of penology, is thus not
part of the American sentencing philosophy. Prosecuting juveniles as adults and
imposing penalties in such cases without regard to their reduced culpability,
maintaining the death penalty and imposing prison sentences without the option
of parole, and applying the sentencing guidelines as though they were mandatory
simply deviates from taking into account for sentencing purposes the personal
circumstances and culpability of a convicted person.
A few isolated, yet important, recent innovations by the U.S. Supreme Court
must be applauded as initiatives that brought the United States closer to
upholding generally accepted standards in its criminal justice system.
Proclaiming juvenile executions,356 and life imprisonment of juveniles without
the option of parole as a mandatory sentence,357 to be in violation of the “cruel
and unusual” criteria of the Eighth Amendment was a step in the right direction,
even though one must admit that the Court had to make a quantum leap to bypass

351
See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) (holding that “it is a precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offence.”).
352
Solem v. Helms, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).
353
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991).
354
Id., at 994.
355
Id., at 994–95.
356
Roper v. Simmons, 354 U.S. 551 (2005).
357
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
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the “unusual” prong of the Eighth Amendment to reach its admirable conclusion
in the life sentence without parole decision. No less than twenty-nine
jurisdictions mandated life sentences without the option of parole for juvenile
offenders, but noting differences that obtain in those jurisdictions, relating for
example to minimum age requirements, whether the transfer of juvenile
offenders to an adult court occurs automatically in the case of some offences or
is left in the discretion of prosecutors, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to find
that the laws applied by state courts meet the criterion of “usual” punishments.358
In coming to this conclusion, the U.S. Supreme Court used language that is
in conformity with international standards of juvenile justice, referring for
example to the “lesser culpability” and “greater capacity for change” of juvenile
offenders,359 and the requirement of “individualised sentencing”360 It
emphasized that a basic precept of justice requires “that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned,” and that individuals consequently have
“the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.”361 The U.S. Supreme Court
proclaimed quite admirably that juveniles have “lessened culpability” and
therefore “are less deserving of the most severe punishments.”362 The “gaps
between juveniles and adults” are threefold: “(a) lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility;” (b) vulnerability or susceptibility “to
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure”, and (c) the
fact that “the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.”363
Such rhetoric is indeed admirable but will remain a voice calling in the dark
as long as juveniles can be prosecuted and sentenced as though they were adults;
or in general, as long as the United States declines to impose the basic norm of
criminology that punishments must not only be determined by the gravity of the
crime, the manner in which it was executed, its harmful consequences, and the
means of perpetration by the convicted person, but should also take note of and
accommodate the personal circumstances of the individual to be sentenced, such
as his or her degree of intent, diminished mental capacity, or individual
circumstances, such as age, background, education, intelligence, and mental
structure.

358
359
360
361
362
363

Id., at 483–89.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69, 74 (2010); Alabama, 567 U.S. at 465.
Alabama, 567 U.S. at 465.
Simmons, 354 U.S. at 560; Alabama, 567 U.S. at 469.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Alabama, 567 U.S. at 471.
Simmons, 354 U.S. at 569–70. See also Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Alabama, 567 U.S. at 471.
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It is to be hoped that the American sentencing system will in the not too
distant future do justice to the concept of “justice” within the true meaning of
the concept of criminal justice!

